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''A GOVERNMENT OF LIMITED AND 
ENUMERATED POWERS": IN DEFENSE 
OF UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ 
Steven G. Calabresi* 
"We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal 
Government of enumerated powers."1 
- Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Lopez2 
marks a revolutionary and long overdue revival of the doctrine that 
the federal government is one of limited and enumerated powers. 
After being "asleep at the constitutional switch" for more than fifty 
years,3 the Court's decision to invalidate an Act of Congress on the 
ground that it exceeded the commerce power must be recognized as 
an extraordinary event. Even if Lopez produces no progeny and is 
soon overruled, the opinion has shattered forever the notion that, 
after fifty years of Commerce Clause precedent, we can never go 
back to the days of limited national power. The Lopez Court has 
shown us that we can go back, if we want to, so long as: 1) we can 
figure out a workable theory of the limits on the federal commerce 
power; 2) we can agree on the propriety of vigorous judicial review 
in federalism cases; and 3) we can take proper account of the im-
portant reliance interests that have accrued around certain key 
precedents decided in the past half century. 
All three of these concerns animate the important separate con-
currence of Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Sandra Day 
* Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1983, 
Yale. - Ed. I am deeply grateful to my colleague Thomas W. Merrill for the very valuable 
suggestions and help he has given me on this article. I am also grateful for the comments of 
Akhil Reed Amar on an earlier draft of this article and for the helpful suggestions of Gary S. 
Lawson, Gregory E. Maggs, Martin H. Redish, and Christopher Rohrbacher. I benefitted 
from presenting an earlier version of this article at a conference on federalism at the Heritage 
Foundation and from presenting it at faculty workshops at the Northwestern University 
School of Law, the University of Virginia School of Law, and Benjamin N. Cardozo School of 
Law. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Mary 'JYler Calabresi, for her encouragement 
and support. 
1. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995). 
2. 115 s. Ct. 1624 {1995). 
3. Expansion Checked, WAu. ST. J., Apr. 27, 1995, at A14. 
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O'Connor in Lopez, 4 and satisfying all three of these concerns is 
necessary if Lopez is to be not merely a significant case but also the 
great landmark case of American constitutional history that it de-
serves to be. Because I believe Lopez has the potential to be as 
important a turning point as NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp. 5 or United States v. Darby, 6 I want to address directly in this 
article the concerns expressed by Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, 
focusing especially on their statement that: 
The substantial element of political judgment in Commerce Clause 
matters leaves our institutional capacity to intervene more in doubt 
than when we decide cases, for instance, under the Bill of Rights even 
though clear and bright lines are often absent in the latter class of 
disputes.7 
This statement, which reflects the weight and thinking of a half cen-
tury of judicial opinions and law review articles,8 is in my judgment 
mistaken. 
Now in fairness to Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, their con-
currence does end up rejecting the present-day orthodoxy because 
they do endorse finally some judicial enforcement of the scheme of 
limited and enumerated powers. But, as the quotation above 
shows, these two concurring Justices seem to be joining the Lopez 
Revolution only after sounding a note of caution and restraint. Is 
there any reason why such a show of judicial modesty is called for? 
Specifically, is it true, as Professor Jesse Choper has claimed, that 
the Supreme Court's institutional capacity to intervene is more in 
doubt in Commerce Clause cases than it is in so-called individual 
rights cases?9 This article seeks to rebut that claim with a norma-
tive discussion in five parts. 
4. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
5. 301 u.s. 1 (1937). 
6. 312 u.s. 100 (1941). 
7. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1640. (citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 630 
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). 
8. For examples of variations on this belief in the legal academic literature, the reader 
could do no better than to consult: JESsE H. CHoPER, JuoiCIAL REVIEw AND nm NATIONAL 
PoLITICAL PROCESS (1980). See also D. Bruce LaPierre, The Political Safeguards of Federal-
ism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WAsH. U. 
L.Q. 779 (1982); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 543 
(1954). But see MARTIN H. REDisH, THE CoNSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRucruRE 23-62 
(1995) (arguing that Choper ignores the normative and textual case for judicial protection of 
federalism); Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 
CoLUM. L. REv. 847 (1979) (arguing that Weschler and Choper's view that the states are 
protected in the national political process is wrong); William Van Alstyne, The Second Death 
of Federalism, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1709 (1985) (arguing that the Constitution never would have 
been ratified had the Framers thought it meant what Choper says). 
9. See CHoPER, supra note 8, at 67-70, 235-40. 
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In Part I, I consider whether federalism is somehow less impor-
tant than the separation of powers, the Bill of Rights, or judicial 
review as a structural feature of American government. If federal-
ism were truly less important, then it would follow that judicial en-
forcement of constitutional federalism guarantees also might be a 
lesser priority. While Justices Kennedy and O'Connor consider and 
reject the proposition that federalism is an unimportant feature of 
American government,10 they do not discuss the possibility that 
federalism actually might be by far the most important and benefi-
cial feature of our constitutional scheme. I argue at some length in 
Part I that federalism is much more important to the liberty and 
well being of the American people than any other structural feature 
of our constitutional system. In so arguing, I present what I per-
ceive to be the best empirical and normative arguments for Ameri-
can federalism. This discussion lays the groundwork for my claim 
that it is vital that some institution enforce our constitutional feder-
alism limitations. 
In Part II, I consider and refute the reigning orthodox argument 
that constitutional federalism guarantees can and should be en-
forced exclusively, or mainly, through the political process. I show 
why, under modem public choice theory, we should have no confi-
dence in the political branches as the exclusive or even as the prin-
cipal enforcers of our constitutional federalism guarantees. Indeed, 
I argue that reliance on the political branches to enforce federalism 
limitations almost guarantees that our constitutional federal system 
will fail to attain the normative benefits - set forth in Part I -
that federalism ought to secure. Accordingly, I conclude Part II by 
arguing that a decision to rely upon the political branches for en-
forcement of federalism would be a grave mistake - a mistake that 
would result in less freedom and less prosperity for future 
generations. 
In Part III, I take up the important and difficult question of 
whether the Supreme Court lacks the institutional capacity to en-
force our constitutional federalism guarantees. My conclusions 
here are three-fold. First, judicial enforcement of the Commerce 
Clause does not raise questions of interpretation or fact that are 
any more troubling than those that the Court regularly struggles 
with in the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment contexts. 
Second, the implications of public choice theory suggest that there 
is absolutely no reason to fear that a runaway Court ever will crip-
10. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1638-39. 
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ple the national government, disabling it from performing vital na-
tional functions. Third, the only valid fear that anyone ever should 
entertain about the Supreme Court's ability to enforce the Consti-
tution in federalism cases is that the Court will do far too little, not 
that it will do too much. 
In Part IV, I consider the claim advanced by Professor Choper, 
among others, that the Supreme Court is needed more in so-called 
individual rights cases than it is in federalism cases and that it there-
fore should save its institutional capital for use in the national 
human rights area.11 In this Part, I attempt to refute the argument 
that the Supreme Court always does more good for the country 
when it enforces its elaborate Fourteenth Amendment case law 
than it would do if it enforced the federalism provisions of the origi-
nal Constitution. I disagree with the argument that the Supreme 
Court always has a comparative normative institutional advantage 
when it is promulgating national codes on abortion,12 flag burn-
ing,13 pomography,t4 holiday displays,15 prison conditions,t6 or pro-
cedural rules on criminal trials and investigations.17 
Finally, in Part V, I consider the problem of precedent. Are the 
reliance interests that have grown up around the Court's Com-
merce Clause precedents so powerful that they overwhelm the 
other normative arguments advanced in Part I of this article? In 
Part V, I argue that even if the Court cannot and should not undo 
past precedents that, upon close analysis, tum out to be mistaken, it 
does not follow that the Court should continue to adhere to a 
wholly mistaken form of analysis in new cases involving new federal 
statutes. The Court's critics, in my view, wrongly seek to hobble its 
power by pointing to its past sins and saying in effect that it is too 
late now for the Court to save itself. The correct response rather 
would be to acknowledge that specific past mistakes cannot always 
be undone, while denying that the Court thus should be held for-
ever in thrall to its past bad methods of decisionmaking in federal-
ism cases. The Court should repent, as perhaps it has done in 
11. See CHoPER, supra note 8, at 169-70. 
12. See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973). 
13. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
' 14. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990). 
15. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
16. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finley, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). 
17. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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Lopez, and then it should "Go and sin no more."18 Whatever reli-
ance interest exists surrounding various past federal programs and 
statutes, there is no continuing reliance interest in having the Court 
review newly enacted programs and statutes in a misguided fashion 
that undermines the central normatively appealing feature of our 
entire constitutional structure. 
I. THE NoRMATIVE CASE FOR FEDERALISM 
World-wide interest in federalism is greater today than it ever 
has been before at any other time in human history. In section A, 
below, I discuss at some length why this is the case and what lessons 
the global federalism revolution might hold for the United States. I 
conclude that federalism is the wave of the future, that nationalism 
and the centralized nation-state have been discredited for good rea-
sons, and that these reasons strongly suggest that the United States 
should retain and strengthen its federal structure. Having devel-
oped what might be called a comparative empirical case for federal-
ism I then turn, in section B, to developing the theoretical 
normative case for federalism. Both the disciplines of economics 
and political science suggest that there is a good case to be made for 
federalism. I develop this case in three subparts by considering, 
first, the arguments for state power, second, the arguments for na-
tional power, and third, the arguments for a federal constitutional 
blend. Finally, in section C, I step back and look briefly at the em-
pirical and normative arguments for federalism in perspective. My 
goal here is to show that federalism is likely to be more important 
to the liberty and well being of the American people than any other 
structural feature of our Constitution, including the separation of 
powers, the Bill of Rights, and judicial review. 
A. Comparative, Historical, and Empirical Arguments 
We all know that since the dawn of the American Republic, a 
mere 200 years ago, there has been a truly extraordinary change in 
the way most people are governed. The world-wide democratic 
revolution so ardently hoped for by Thomas Jefferson19 and James 
18. RoBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPTING oF AMERICA: THE PoUTICAL SEnucnoN OF mE 
LAw 159 (1990). 
19. As Jefferson wrote in a letter to George Mason, 
I look with great anxiety for the firm establishment of the new government in France, 
being perfectly convinced that if it takes place there, it will spread sooner or later all 
over Europe. On the contrary a check there would retard the revival of liberty in other 
countries. I consider the establishment and success of their government as necessary to 
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Madison20 has come to pass and has swept across the globe, relegat-
ing monarchy, aristocracy, empire, Napoleonic dictatorship, na-
tional socialism, fascism, and now, communism, to the ash heap of 
history. It is easy to forget, however, that at the same time that the 
democratic revolution occurred, and often for many of the same 
reasons, a very powerful but much less benign "nationalist revolu-
tion" also swept across the world. It is worth reminding ourselves 
briefly of the history of that nationalist revolution because its harsh 
legacy is still with us in many ways and because it has given rise to 
what I will call the "Age of Federalism" in which we now live. 
stay up our own, and to prevent it from falling back to that kind of Half-way house, the 
English constitution. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Mason (Feb. 4, 1791), reprinted in THE PoLITICAL 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 101 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1993). 
Years later, in 1821, Jefferson elaborated, 
As yet we are but in the first chapter of its history. The appeal to the rights of man, 
which had been made in the U.S. was taken up by France, first of the European nations. 
From her the spirit has spread over those of the South. The tyrants of the North have 
allied indeed against it, but it is irresistible. Their opposition will only multiply its mil-
lions of human victims; their own satellites will catch it, and the condition of man thro' 
the civilized world will be finally and greatly ameliorated. This is a wonderful instance 
of great events from small causes. So inscrutable is the arrangement of causes & conse-
quences in this world that a two-penny duty on tea, unjustly imposed in a sequestered 
part of it, changes the condition of all its inhabitants .... 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY, 1821, reprinted in id. at 100-01. 
Finally, in his last letter written 11 days before he died on July 4, 1826, Jefferson wrote: 
May [the Fourth of July] be to the world, what I believe it will be, (to some parts sooner, 
to others later, but finally to all,) the signal of arousing men to burst the chains under 
which monkish ignorance and superstition had persuaded them to bind themselves, and 
to assume the blessings and security of self-government. That form which we have sub-
stituted, restores the free right to the unbounded exercise of reason and freedom of 
opinion. All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of 
the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass 
of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and 
spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of God. These are grounds of 
hope for others. For ourselves, let the annual return of this day forever refresh our 
recollections of these rights, and an undiminished devotion to them .... 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Roger C. Weightman (June 24, 1826), reprinted in id. at 213. 
20. James Madison shared Jefferson's sentiments as is revealed in the following passage 
from a letter to George Nicholas written in March 1793: 
The war in which [France] is engaged seems likely to be pushed by her enemies during 
the ensuing campaign. As yet her conduct has been great both as a free and [as aj 
martial nation. We hope it will continue so, and finally baffle all her enemies, who are in 
fact the enemies of human nature. We have every motive in America to pray for her 
success, not only from a general attachment to the liberties of mankind, but from a 
peculiar regard for our own. The symptoins of disaffection to Republican government 
have risen, and subsided among us in such visible correspondence with the prosperous 
and adverse accounts from the French Revolution, that a miscarriage of it would 
threaten us with the most serious dangers to the present forms and principles of our 
governments. 
RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 339-40 {1990). 
758 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:752 
1. The Rise and Fall of Nationalism 
The nationalist revolution that began about 200 years ago was 
linked closely with the democratic revolution that Thomas Jefferson 
and James Madison helped launch. It had similar underpinnings in 
the rationalist thought of the Enlightenment and a similar an-
tifeudal, anti-aristocratic orientation. It was inspired to some de-
gree by the American Revolution, gathered force with the French 
Revolution, and dominated the globe from 1789 unti11945.21 It de-
stroyed countless aristocratic transnational entities like the Holy 
Roman Empire, the Spanish and Portuguese Empires in Latin 
America, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the British and French 
Empires in Asia and Africa, and, most recently, the Soviet Commu-
nist Empire. It also destroyed countless regional and local feudal 
entities. In Europe, for example, both the German principalities 
and the Italian city states lost power when Germany and Italy were 
forged out of the remains of the Holy Roman and Austro-
Hungarian Empires. 
Democrats and nationalists were political allies in Europe, Latin 
America, Asia, and Africa in the fight against feudalism, monarchy, 
and colonial empire.22 Thus, from 1789 to 1914, most democrats 
were nationalists, and most nationalists were democrats. This inter-
linking of democracy and nationalism was the peculiar and bitter-
sweet legacy of the French Revolution. The American Revolution 
obviously also had interlinked democracy and nationalism, but its 
final Federalist outcome muted the connection. Not so with the 
French Revolution, the Napoleonic nationalist conclusion of which 
was crushed temporarily by the forces of the old transnational aris-
tocratic, feudal order.23 For the better part of the nineteenth cen-
tury, European democrats had every reason to revel in the 
nationalism of the French Revolution and to use it as a political tool 
for whipping the people into a populist frenzy against their aristo-
cratic oppressors. 
21. See JoHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CiviL LAW TRAnmoN 14-18 {2d ed. 1985). See 
generally 1 R.R. PALMER, THE AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: THE CHALLENGE 
{1959) {discussing democratic revolutions in America and Europe from 1760-1800); 2 R.R. 
PALMER, THE AGE OF DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: THE STRUGGLE (1964) (same). 
22. The advocates of democracy and nationalism were inspired by Enlightenment ideas 
about natural law, natural rights, and rationalism. Evidence of the interlinking of all of these 
ideas can be seen, for example, in our own Declaration of Independence. 
23. Those forces gathered at the Congress of Vienna after Napoleon's armies had been 
defeated by the Duke of Wellington, and they sought there to recreate the pre-1789 Euro-
pean social and political order. Their success in this regard proved to be only temporary. 
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The bitter harvest of the nationalist revolution was gathered in 
this century with the slaughter of the First and Second World Wars 
and with the fifty-year Cold War that then followed. These events 
finally made clear to the great-great-grandchildren of the Enlight-
enment that celebration of the nation state could lead to Nazism 
and Stalinism, to war and genocide, and to totalitarianism and the 
most complete loss of freedom humankind ever experienced. By 
1945, the democratic revolution was still in full flow, but the nation-
alist revolution was not. World leaders scrambled to replace the 
still collapsing colonial, imperial transnational structures with new 
federal and confederal transnational structures. 
The fifty years since then have seen the birth of the United Na-
tions, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Euro-
pean Union, the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
British Commonwealth, the Confederation of Independent States 
(CIS), the GATT, the NAFTA, and countless other transnational 
"federal" entities of varying degrees of importance.24 Many of 
these were openly inspired by the success story of American feder-
alism, which, for example, led many Europeans to want to build a 
Common Market that could become a "United States of Europe." 
While many of these new democratic transnational entities are very 
weak, they nonetheless have developed important powers: they 
have helped to keep the peace, and in some instances, as with the 
European Union, they show real potential for some day attaining 
essentially all the attributes of sovereignty commonly associated 
with a federal nation-state, like the United States. The growth and 
success of transnational confederal forms since 1945 is truly aston-
ishing and rightly is viewed by many - either with alarm or with 
hope - as holding out the eventual prospect of a future global fed-
eral government or at least the prospect of several continental-sized 
federal governments. 
At the same time, U.S.-style constitutional federalism has be-
come the order of the day in an extraordinarily large number of 
24. For a thoughtful treatment of federalism problems within the GATI and a fascinating 
consideration of similarities between the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and various 
legal rules in the GATI, see Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regu-
latory State: A GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1401 
(1994). 
Many of these transnational entities still seem very weak to contemporary Americans 
who may be tempted to dismiss their importance and deny their "federal" qualities. These 
entities, however, compare favorably in many cases with our own early attempts at federal 
government under the Articles of Confederation and then the Constitution. We should not 
be blinded to these facts by overly formal definitions of what constitutes a federation or a 
confederation. 
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very important countries, some of which once might have been 
thought of as pure nation-states. Thus, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Republic of Austria, the Russian Federation, Spain, 
India, and Nigeria all have decentralized power by adopting consti-
tutions that are significantly more federalist than the ones they re-
placed.25 Many other nations that had been influenced long ago by 
American federalism have chosen to retain and formalize their fed-
eral structures. Thus, the federalist constitutions of Australia, Can-
ada, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, for example, all are basically 
alive and well today. 
As one surveys the world in 1995, American-style federalism of 
some kind or another is everywhere triumphant, while the forces of 
nationalism, although still dangerous, seem to be contained or in 
retreat. The few remaining highly centralized democratic nation-
states like Great Britain,26 France, and Italy all face serious seces-
sionist or devolutionary crises.27 Other highly centralized nation-
states, like China, also seem ripe for a federalist, as well as a demo-
cratic, change. Even many existing federal and confederal entities 
seem to face serious pressure to devolve power further than they 
have done so far: thus, Russia, Spain, Canada, and Belgium all 
have very serious devolutionary or secessionist movements of some 
kind. Indeed, secessionist pressure has been so great that some fed-
eral structures recently have collapsed under its weight, as has hap-
pened in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet Union. 
All of this still could be threatened, of course, by a resurgence of 
nationalism in Russia or elsewhere, but the long-term antinational-
ist trend seems fairly secure. There is no serious intellectual sup-
port for nationalism anywhere in the world today, whereas 
everywhere people seem interested in exploring new transnational 
25. For a general discussion of the trend toward federalism in civil law countries, see 
MERRYMAN, supra note 21, at 151-58. 
26. See WILL HurroN, THE STATE WE'RE IN (1995); ANDREW MAim, RuLINo BRIT AN· 
NIA: THE FAILURE AND FUTURE OF BRITISH DEMOCRACY (1995); Fred Barbash, The Move-
ment to Rule Britannia Differently: Popularity Grows for Written Constitution, Bill of Rights, 
Senate-Like Chamber, WASH. PoST, Sept. 23, 1995, at A27. 
27. Separatist demands have been raised, for example, by Scotland and Northern Ireland 
against the government of the United Kingdom, by Britany and Corsica against the national 
government of France, and by the Lombard League against the national government of Italy. 
One commentator has written recently that "[s]eparatism is a fact, the single greatest political 
fact of the post-cold war world. With external enemies removed, with hybrid states no longer 
held together by hegemonic super powers, the petty annoyances and existential difficulties of 
living in mixed-ethnic marriages within nation-states has become increasingly intolerable." 
Charles Krauthammer, Quebec and the Death of Diversity, TIME, Nov. 13, 1995, at 124. 
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and devolutionary federal forms.28 The democratic revolution that 
was launched in Philadelphia in 1776 has won, and now it seems 
that democrats everywhere join Madison in "cherishing the spirit 
and supporting the character of federalists. "29 
2. Why Has Federalism Become So Globally Popular? 
Why, then, we should ask ourselves, is federalism so incredibly 
popu1ar all over the world today? Why is it that the centralized 
nation-state is under simultaneous assau1t at the end of the twenti-
eth century from both an internationalist and a secessionist-
devolutionist direction? The answers to these questions are highly 
complex, but two major factors are evident. 
a. Federalism as a Response to the Problem of Majority 
Tyranny. First, federalism is popu1ar today because in a surprisingly 
large number of circumstances it has the potential to offer a direct 
cure to a central and age-old failing of democracy: the tendency of 
certain kinds of political majorities to tyrannize and abuse certain 
kinds of political minorities.30 This problem - majority tyranny -
is a problem in all democracies, but it is most acute in democracies 
that are very heterogeneous as a matter of their racial, ethnic, reli-
gious, linguistic, or social class background. It is the problem that 
concerned James Madison in the Federalist Ten,31 and it is the prob-
lem that has generated support in this country· and around the 
world for judicial review. 
Arend Lijphart, a distinguished and leading political scientist, 
puts the matter as follows: 
That it is difficult to achieve and maintain stable democratic govern-
ment in a plural society is a well-established proposition in political 
science - with a history reaching back to Aristotle's adage that "a 
state aims at being, as far as it can be, a society composed of equals 
and peers." Social homogeneity and political consensus are regarded 
as prerequisites for, or factors strongly conducive to, stable democ-
racy. Conversely, the deep social divisions and political differences 
within plural societies are held responsible for instability and break-
down in democracies.32 
28. See Giandomenico Majone, Preservation of Cultural Diversity in a Federal System: 
The Role of the Regions, in CoMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERAUSM: EUROPE AND 
AMERICA 67-75 (Mark Thshnet ed., 1990). 
29. THE FEDERAUST No. 10, at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
30. See generally Steven G. Calabresi, Note, A Madisonian Interpretation of the Equal 
Protection Doctrine, 91 YALE LJ. 1403 (1982) (discussing ways of protecting minority rights 
without at the same time undermining majority rule). 
31. THE FEDERAUST No. 10 (James Madison); see also Calabresi, supra note 30. 
32. AREND LJJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SociETIES: A CoMPARATIVE EXPLORA-
TION 1 (1977) (citation omitted). Lijphart also develops his ideas on democracy in plural 
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As Lijphart emphasizes, social heterogeneity can pose a big threat 
to stable democratic government. Federalism sometimes can re-
duce this threat by giving minorities a level of government within 
which they are the geographical majority. If minorities are concen-
trated geographically to some degree and if the nation is willing to 
cede control over key issues to constitutionally established subunits 
of the nation, then federalism can help maintain social peace. 
Obviously there are some very big "ifs" here that cannot always 
be satisfied. But, in a very important and growing category of 
cases, voters are discovering that they can solve the problem of ma-
jority tyranny simply by redrawing the jurisdictional lines of gov-
ernment. This redrawing can take two forms. Sometimes 
expanding the size of the polity is enough to make a formerly tyran-
nical majority only one of many minorities in the new, more "inter-
national" federal jurisdiction. This solution is the familiar 
"pluralist" solution of Federalist Ten. 33 Other times, the redrawing 
involves a devolution of national power over a certain set of emo-
tionally charged and sensitive issues down to a regional or local fed-
eralist entity. This solution is the one employed by Spain with 
Catalonia and the Basque Country and by Canada with Quebec.34 
Both kinds of jurisdictional line redrawing are related closely 
because they are both attempts to deal with the threat of majority 
tyranny in a socially heterogeneous democracy. Both address the 
problem that raw democracy is nothing more than rule by a major-
ity of the demos,35 and the definition of what constitutes the demos 
may be inherently arbitrary. Thus, it turns out that for people in 
many federations all over the world, the relevant demos may differ 
depending on what issue is being addressed. For residents of Que-
bec, for example, the relevant demos for language issues may be 
their provincial government, the relevant demos for trade issues 
may include all of Canada or all of NAFTA, and the relevant demos 
for deciding how to respond to an intercontinental nuclear attack 
may include all of NATO. 
This type of jurisdictional line drawing is often more than just a 
matter of providing for a common-sensical allocation of govern-
societies in AREND LUPHART, THE Pouncs oF AccoMMODATION: PLURAUSM AND DE-
MOCRACY IN THE NETHERLANDS {1968), and CONFUCT AND COEXISTENCE IN BELGIUM: DY-
NAMICS OF A CuLTURALLY DIVIDED SOCIETY (Arend Lijphart ed., 1981). 
33. THE FEDERAUST No. 10 (James Madison). 
34. For a thoughtful discussion of the role of the use of federalism to protect geographi· 
cally based minorities, see James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complimentary 
and Competing Paradigms, 41 V AND. L. REv. 1251 (1994). 
35. Demos, of course, means "the people" in Greek. 
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mental decisionmaking power.36 Rather, it is frequently a direct re-
sponse to the central problem that political philosophers always 
have perceived with democracy, the problem of majority tyranny. 
It is thus unsurprising that Jefferson and Madison's democratic 
revolution has brought in its wake a federalism revolution. Federal-
ism tempers the excesses of democracy whereas nationalism aggra-
vates them. Federalism forces us always to ask why is a majority of 
this demos relevant for deciding this issue. Federalism thus allows 
democratic social cooperation in many circumstances in which na-
tionalism does not. 
Federalism clearly is not the only constitutional mechanism for 
dealing with majority tyranny in a socially heterogeneous polity. 
Other mechanisms for dealing with this problem include: judicial 
review, separation of powers with checks and balances, propor-
tional representation, the creation of collegial cabinet-style execu-
tives, and the complex interlocking web of practices that Arend 
Lijphart calls "consociational democracy."37 But federalism is a 
uniquely successful constitutional device for dealing with many of 
the most heartfelt and divisive problems of social heterogeneity. 
No one thinks the Bosnian Serbs, the Basques, or the Quebecois 
ever could be appeased and satisfied by firmer guarantees of judi-
cial review, separation of powers, proportional representation, or 
cabinet power sharing. Those solutions - while they might help 
somewhat at the margins - really do not get at the heart of their 
distinctive grievances. The problem that agitates the Bosnian 
Serbs, the Basques, or the Quebecois is that, in important ways and 
as to questions that are fundamental to their identity, they do not 
believe that they should be part of the same demos as their fellow 
countrymen. At the same time, as to other economic and foreign 
policy issues, they may be perfectly happy to remain within a larger 
entity so long as their social autonomy is guaranteed in iron-clad 
ways. Federalism addresses these needs in a way that no other con-
stitutional power-sharing mechanism can hope to do. 
Moreover, and very importantly, federalism sometimes can 
make minority groups feel secure while deemphasizing the lines of 
36. Professor Lino Graglia sometimes has criticized his conservative friends on the 
Supreme Court and in the academy for their undemocratic willingness to strike down acts of 
Congress on federalism grounds. See Lino Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constitution: Posner 
on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1019, 1027-28 (1992). Such invalidations are not, however, un-
democratic. They are jurisdictional resolutions of the question whether federal or state de-
mocracy should prevail. I owe this point to a conversation with Professor Gregory Maggs in 
July, 1995. 
37. See LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SoCIETIES, supra note 32. 
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political and social cleavage.38 Thus, it is not always necessary or 
indeed desirable that federal units and subunits correspond with 
great ~xactness to the precise geographical lines that most com-
pletely and thoroughly would separate out distinctive minority 
groups and subgroups. Federalism works better, in my view, when 
it allows those groups a say in governmental decisionmaking while 
blurring and masking over the fault lines of social division. A few 
examples may help to make this point a little clearer. 
Let us start with an example of how not to set up a minority-
protecting federal regime. Consider here the cases of Canada and 
the former Czechoslovak federation, which recently fell apart. In 
both instances, it seems striking that the principal minority group 
almost entirely was contained within the boundaries of one and 
only one province or subfederal entity. In Canada, the overwhelm-
ing majority of French-speaking Canadians live in Quebec, and, in 
Czechoslovakia, the overwhelming majority of Slovaks lived in 
Slovakia with relatively few living in Bohemia or Moravia. Geo-
graphical federalism in these two federations accentuated and em-
phasized the linguistic and ethnic social division instead of blurring 
it over. The division was sharpened further by the absence of what 
Arend Lijphart has called "crosscutting social cleavages. "39 Thus, 
in Canada, for example, the Quebecois tend to be Catholic and rel-
atively poorer than their Protestant English-speaking country-
men.40 In Slovakia, the Slovaks tended to be poorer and more 
Catholic than their Czech-speaking, more Protestant countrymen.41 
Thus, in both countries, the social fault lines of language, ethnicity, 
religion, and class all reinforced each other and coincided precisely 
with the geographical boundaries of the relevant federal subunits. 
This situation is a recipe ultimately for secession or at least for a 
very major devolution in powers over cultural and social issues.42 
Similar though not identical situations have led to trouble in other 
very heterogeneous countries like Belgium, Cyprus, and Lebanon. 
38. Federations are not always set up in a way that makes this happen, as the discussion 
that follows makes clear. But, when they are properly designed, I think they are less likely 
than proportional representation schemes to lead to trouble. 
39. See LUPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SoCIETIES, supra note 32, at 71·81. 
40. See id. at 119-29. 
41. See Frances D'Emilio, Protestant Martyrs Honored by Pope, Prrr. PoST-GAZETIE, 
July 3, 1995, at A3 (discussing the ancient rift between Catholic Slovaks and Eastern Euro-
pean protestants); Viera Langerova, Czechs, Slovaks Agree to Split, Cm. SUN-TIMES, June 20, 
1992, at 3 (noting that Slovaks constituted the poorer section of former Czechoslovakia). 
42. See LUPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SoCIETIES, supra note 32, at 44 n.31 (citing 
ERIC A. NORDLINGER, CONFLICT REGULATION IN DIVIDED SOCrETIES (Occasional Paper in 
Inti. Affairs No. 29, 1972)). 
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On the other side of the equatiop., consider two of the world's 
truly great federalism success stories: Switzerland and the United 
States. Both have an extraordinarily large number of federal 
subunits, no single one of which coincides totally with any single 
social minority group. As a result, Switzerland's twenty-five can-
tons and the fifty American states provide plenty of opportunities 
for social minority groups to dominate particular federal subentities 
without encouraging secession by, in effect, creating a country 
within a country. 
The fortuitous existence of large numbers of federal subunits in 
countries like Switzerland and the United States blurs over the fault 
lines of social division while greatly raising the costs of secessionist 
and devolutionary political movements. To organize secession -
or a civil war - in such a federation requires first that you put 
together a group of cantons or states that want to secede. There 
may be serious collective action problems in doing this, particularly 
if the national entity is adept at buying off some of the cantons or 
states that might be needed most for the secession to succeed. Se-
cessionists in Quebec or Slovakia face no such obstacle, however, 
because in those instances the geography of federalism reinforces 
social fault lines instead of covering them over.43 
Federalism in countries like Switzerland and the United States 
also works because of two other fortuitous accidents of history. 
First, no one state or canton is a great deal larger than all of the rest 
in a way that might create tension or fear of domination in the 
smaller states. This problem was the undoing of the former Soviet 
Union; after Gorbachev's glasnost, because Russia was so much 
larger and more populous than all of the other fourteen Republics 
combined, the others could not imagine a Soviet Federation in 
which they would be anything other than very junior partners. Ger-
many's size could have posed a similar problem for the European 
Union countries had they not averted this trouble by greatly ex-
43. The collective action problem created for secessionists by the existence of a large 
number of federal subunits was helpful to the North in winning the American Civil War. 
Problems of coordination delayed secession until the 1860s, left several border states in the 
Northern camp, and hindered the South's ability to fight the Civil War successfully. Our 
large number of federal subunits helped the Union to survive the struggle over slavery. The 
geography of federalism also may matter if not all the states that wish to secede are contigu-
ous to each other. Conversely, a federation may be very interested in preventing secession or 
in encouraging union in order to obtain contiguity. Such issues were important in the desire 
of the Framers to secure ratification of the Constitution by New York. They also were rele-
vant in the struggle over Vicksburg during the Civil War, the purpose of which was to split 
the Confederacy. A lack of contiguity helped lead to the separation of Bangladesh from 
Pakistan in 1971. Finally, worry over these issues has made English Canada more eager to 
prevent the secession of Quebec, which would isolate geographically the maritime provinces. 
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panding the size of the Union of which Germany was a part. Simi-
larly, the Framers of the American federation could have faced a 
similar problem had the State of Virginia, Mother of presidents,44 
held onto all or most of the Northwest Territories45 instead of ced-
ing them to the national government. Imagine the tumultuous early 
history the United States could have had if the present states of 
Virginia, West Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois all had been one 
state in a federation that did not extend yet beyond the Mississippi 
River! 
A second fortuitous accident of history that has made Swiss and 
American federalism work is that in both federations, unlike in 
Canada or Czechoslovakia, there are many crosscutting social 
cleavages. Thus, in Switzerland, the majority of German speakers 
and the minority of French speakers both are divided fairly equally 
into Protestant and Catholic subgroups and into urban and rural 
subgroups. The religious and urban-rural cleavages crosscut both 
each other and the language cleavage. Thus, this small four-
language federal polity is remarkably stable because it naturally 
possesses the plurality of small interest groups envisioned by 
Madison's Federalist Ten. On any given issue, rural French-
speaking Catholics may have more in common with rural German-
speaking Catholics than they do with their urban French-speaking 
Protestant brethren. 
The United States similarly is blessed, so much so that most 
Americans are not even aware either of how divided or how lucky 
they truly are. The U.S. has four major geographic regions - the 
Northeast, the Midwest, the South, and the West- each of which 
easily could be a separate country. Although language does not di-
vide these regions, all students of American politics know that they 
vote very differently in presidential and other elections and that 
they particularly disagree on matters of religion, culture, and, to 
44. Virginia received this nickname early in our history because four of the first five Pres-
idents, Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, all were from Virginia. In addition, 
three of the next seven Presidents, Harrison, 'I}tler, and Taylor, all were born there. 
Obviously, Virginia so dominated the presidency early in our history for the same reason 
that California dominates it today. Virginia, was then, as California is now, the richest prize 
in the Electoral College. 
45. Many states claimed part of the Northwest Territories as their own. Virginia, how-
ever, had the best claims to by far the largest portion. Cession of the Territories to the 
Articles of Confederation Congress eliminated the need to adjudicate these claims and pre-
vented Virginia from emerging as a federation threatening megastate. See EDMUND S. 
MoRGAN, THE Bmm OFlHE REPUBuc, 1763-1789, at 108-12 (Daniel J. Boorstin ed., 1956). 
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some extent, on race and ethnicity.46 The South, broadly defined to 
include the border states, is especially unique. 
The South is more religious, more culturally conservative, less 
Catholic, and more racially polarized in its voting behavior than the 
rest of the country. Southern block voting for decades kept the 
Congress and even the White House in Democratic hands, and it 
· now may be just as likely to keep those institutions in Republican 
hands. Whereas the other three regions of the country are evenly 
divided between the parties, the South has gone from being solidly 
Democratic to being solidly Republican in national elections.47 
Frankly, if the U.S. federation consisted of only four states, I think 
the things that make the South different from the rest of the coun-
try would generate serious devolutionary and even secessionist 
pressure. 
The West, however, also differs sharply from the rest of the 
country. It is comparatively thin in population, libertarian in its 
politics, and resentful of the enormous federal land holdings from 
which it alone suffers. Rumblings of rebellion are heard from time 
to time in Alaska and in some of the Rocky Mountain states. At 
the same time, California and the Pacific Rim states are well aware 
of their nation-sized economies and, at times, resent domination by 
east coast politicians. Western disaffection might be more serious if 
the West were not able already to dominate federal politics when it 
votes as a block with the South as it essentially did in 1968, 1972, 
1980, 1984, and 1988 - five of the last seven presidential elec-
tions.48 If the whole of the West constituted only one state, it would 
never agree to current federal policies on the environment and land 
use, and it would never stay in any American federation that the 
South chose to leave. 
The Northeast is simultaneously more secular, more Catholic, 
and more ethnic than the rest of the country. It has a high popula-
tion density, is environmentally sensitive and culturally liberal, and 
46. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERAUSM: A VIEw FROM TilE STATES 117-40 
(1st ed. 1966); DAVID L. SHAPffiO, FEDERAUSM: A DIALOGUE 86-87 (1995). 
47. Recent voting patterns suggest that within a decade, the Southern state legislatures all 
will be Republican-controlled as well, assuming the trends of the past 30 years continue. See 
John McQuaid, Tauzin's GOP Jump Predictable, NEw ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 8, 
1995, at A1 (describing the growing dominance of the Republican party in the traditionally 
Democratic South). 
48. President Clinton's campaign manager in 1992, James Carville, has recognized the 
importance of capturing these regions in order to win the presidency. See Wesley Pruden, 
The Grand Coalition of 45 Percent, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1992, at A5 (describing Carville's 
admission that he had not found the key to open the GOP's sunbelt lock on the Electoral 
College but merely had "picked the lock" this one time). 
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favors relatively higher levels of government redistribution of re-
sources. Although traditionally it was the wealthiest region of the 
country, it is rapidly converging toward the national norm as the 
Southern, Plains, and Rocky Mountain states all have been catching 
up.49 It has been highly disaffected with recent Sunbelt dominance 
of national politics, and this disaffection surely would be more pro-
nounced if the whole Northeast constituted a single megastate in a 
four-state federation. 
Lastly, there is the Midwest, heartland of the country and, of all 
the four regions, the one that is the closest to the national norms on 
all major indicators. While it has things in common with each of the 
other regions, it is too small relative to them to play peacemaker 
when they are really at odds. The Midwest tends to follow the na-
tional trends as much as it leads them. It does not and cannot dom-
inate federal politics the way Germany dominates European 
politics or the way Russia dominated Soviet politics. 
All of these brief sketches should suggest the powerful 
centrifugal and devolutionary pressures that lurk just beneath the 
surface of American public life. Why is it, then, that the American 
federation has held together so peacefully in the 130 years since 
1865? First, the fortuitous division of the Union into fifty states 
helps enormously by accentuating many minor and some not so mi-
nor cleavages that crosscut the regional cleavage. For the disbeliev-
ing skeptic, let me just catalogue very briefly a few of these. 
Believe it or not: northern New England distrusts southern New 
England; southern New England distrusts New York; New Yorkers 
think they are different from Pennsylvanians; Maryland is really a 
border state; Virginia is deep South; Carolinians and Georgians 
think northern Virginia has a lot of Yankees; Florida is full of 
northern retirees and Cuban immigrants; Louisiana is sui generis 
because of the Cajun-French influence; Tennessee, Kentucky, and 
Arkansas are all border states; Indiana is a lot more rural and con-
servative than Ohio or Illinois; Michigan is conservative ethnic, 
while Wisconsin and Minnesota are dominated by Scandinavian 
and German progressives; the northern plains states differ from the 
49. See Bernard Wysocki Jr., Income Gap Between Regions Na"ows: Theory of Conver-
gence Calls for Longer View, WAll ST. J., Oct 4, 1995, at A2. Mr. Wysocki reports that in 
1929, looking at per capita income as a percentage of the U.S. average showed that the rich· 
est regions were at about 140% of the U.S. average while the poorest regions were at 50% of 
the U.S. average. Today, the richest regions are at about 120% while the poorest are around 
85%. The big losers since 1929 have been New England, the Mid-Atlantic states, the Far 
West, and the Great Lakes states; the big winners have been the Plains states, the Rocky 
Mountain states, and the states of both the Southeast and the Southwest. 
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central plains states; and Texas, California, Utah, Alaska, and Ha-
waii are all practically separate countries, while the desert south-
west differs from the Rocky Mountain west, which in tum differs 
from the Pacific Northwest. 
All these state and local cleavages crosscut the big regional 
cleavages, making them less visible and less dangerous. In addition, 
other important crosscutting cleavages exist as well: the Catholi-
cism of the northeast dampens its secularism; the rising wealth of 
the South, Plains states, and Rocky Mountain West diminishes the 
old William Jennings Bryan era rural-urban split, as does the na-
tionwide rise of the suburbs; and most importantly, and most sadly, 
severe racial tensions growing out of the legacy of slavery are a 
problem for all four major regions, even if those problems produce 
the most polarized voting only in the South. 
These nationwide crosscutting cleavages make American feder-
alism stable because they give it a Madisonian plurality of interest 
groups, no one of which is likely to terrorize the others on a perma-
nent basis. American federal politics involves the assembling and 
maintaining of shifting and unstable coalitions of numerous groups 
with wildly different goals. The very instability of these continental, 
federal coalitions is what makes the whole thing work. No one feels 
permanently threatened because the combination of federalism, a 
separately elected Congress and President, and a very high degree 
of instability in political coalitions guarantees almost every faction a 
piece of the pie. All of this is facilitated greatly by our highly fortu-
itous division into fifty states, which masks over the underlying re-
gional fault lines. 
The United States, then, like Switzerland, provides a textbook 
example of how federalism under some circumstances can help alle-
viate the problem of majority tyranny - the key problem that is 
raised by the democratic revolution of the past 200 years. What 
then of separation of powers or cabinet power sharing or propor-
tional representation? Are not these constitutional mechanisms for 
dealing with social and political heterogeneity just as good at allevi-
ating the problem of majority tyranny? The answer to this ques-
tion, I think, is no. All three mechanisms work by exposing and 
making visible the most dangerous social fault lines and then giving 
each social group something close to a veto over governmental 
decisionmaking. This tends to produce weak, if not paralyzed, coa-
lition governments and societies that are acutely, if not bitterly, 
aware of their social divisions. 
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Frankly, people are happier, in my view, when their governmen-
tal structure provides some outlets for their minority viewpoints but 
does so in a way that blurs over and deemphasizes the fault lines as 
much as possible. Sometimes that blurring over is best accom-
plished by governmental structures and policies that accentuate 
crosscutting fault lines over the ones that are more socially danger-
ous. American federalism blurs over regional fault lines, racial fault 
lines, and religious and cultural fault lines, just as Swiss federalism 
blurs over linguistic fault lines, ethnic fault lines, and religious fault 
lines. 5° 
Small state federalism is a big part of what keeps the peace in 
countries like the United States and Switzerland. It is a big part of 
the reason why we do not have a Bosnia or a Northern Ireland or a 
Basque country or a Chechnya or a Corsica or a Quebec problem.sl 
American federalism in the end is not a trivial matter or a quaint 
historical anachronism. American-style federalism is a thriving and 
vital institutional arrangement - partly planned by the Framers, 
partly the accident of history - and it prevents violence and war. It 
prevents religious warfare, it prevents secessionist warfare, and it 
prevents racial warfare. It is part of the reason why democratic ma-
joritarianism in the United States has not produced violence or se-
cession for 130 years, unlike the situation for example, in England, 
France, Germany, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, or 
Spain. There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that is more impor-
tant or that has done more to promote peace, prosperity, and free-
dom than the federal structure of that great document. There is 
nothing in the U.S. Constitution that should absorb more com-
pletely the attention of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
b. Internationalist Federalism: Preventing War, Promoting Free 
Trade, and Exploiting Economies of Scale. So far, I have focused 
on the advantages of American-style small-state federalism in 
defusing centrifugal devolutionary tendencies, alleviating majority 
tyranny, and accentuating crosscutting social cleavages. But what 
about the advantages of international federalism; what are the ad-
SO. The argument here is the same as the general argument for geographical districting 
over proportional representation. The one accentuates social fault lines, the other blurs them 
over. This argument is presently occurring in an especially poignant form with respect to 
racial gerrymandering under the Voting Rights Act. See Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. 
Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry Into the Problem of Racial Gerrymandering Under the Voting 
Rights Act, 92 MICH. L. REv. 652 (1993). 
51. All these federations would benefit greatly from having more states. Imagine a Cana-
dian federation with 50 provinces, 15 of them French-speaking. The collective action prob-
lem thus created would raise greatly the costs of separatist agitation while preserving the 
benefits of federalism for Canada's French-speaking minority. 
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vantages of consolidating states into larger federal entities, as hap-
pened in North America in 1787 or in Europe in 1957? 
A first and obvious advantage is that consolidation reduces the 
threat of war. Because war usually occurs when two or more states 
compete for land or other resources, a reduction in the number of 
states also will reduce the likelihood of war. This result is especially 
true if the reduction in the number of states eliminates land bound-
aries between states that are hard to police, generate friction and 
border disputes, and that may require large standing armies to de-
fend. In a brilliant article, Professor Akhil Amar has noted the im-
portance of this point to both to the Framers of our Constitution 
and to President Abraham Lincoln.52 Professor Amar shows that 
they believed a Union of States was essential in North America be-
cause otherwise the existence of land boundaries would lead here 
- as it had in Europe - to the creation of standing armies and 
ultimately to war.53 The Framers accepted the old British notion 
that it was Britain's island situation that had kept her free of war 
and, importantly, free of a standing army that could be used to op-
press the liberties of the people in a way that the British navy never 
could. 
These old geostrategic arguments for federalist consolidation 
obviously hold true today and played a role in the forming of the 
European Union, the United Nations, and almost every other mul-
tinational federation or alliance that has been created since 1945. 
Sometimes the geostrategic argument is expanded to become an ar-
gument for a multinational defensive alliance, like NATO, against a 
destabilizing power, like the former Soviet Union. In this variation, 
international federalism is partly a means of providing for the com-
mon defense and partly a means of reducing the likelihood of intra-
alliance warfare in order to produce a united front against the 
prime military threat. Providing for the common defense, though, 
is itself a second and independent reason for forming international 
federations. It was a motivation for the formation of the U.S. fed-
eration in 1787 and, more recently, the European Union. 
A third related advantage is that international federations can 
undertake a host of governmental activities in which there are sig-
nificant economies of scale. This is one reason why federations can 
provide better for the common defense than can their constituent 
parts. Intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered aircraft 
52. See Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 483 (1991). 
53. See id. at 486-91. 
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carriers and submarines, and B-2 stealth bombers tend to be expen-
sive. Economies of scale make it cheaper for fifty states to produce 
one set of these items than it would be for fifty states to try to pro-
duce fifty sets. This is true even without factoring in the North 
American regional tensions that would be created if this continent 
had to endure the presence of fifty nuclear minipowers, assuming 
that each small state could afford to own at least one Hiroshima-
sized nuclear bomb. Important governmental economies of scale 
obtain in other areas, as well, however, going well beyond national 
defense. For example, there are important economies of scale to 
the governmental provision of space programs, scientific and bi-
omedical research programs, the creation of transportation infra-
structure, and even the ru~ng of some kinds of income and wealth 
redistribution programs. 
A fourth and vital advantage to international federations is that 
they can promote the free movement of goods and labor both 
among the components of the federation by reducing internal trans-
action costs and internationally by providing a unified front that 
reduces the costs of collective action when bargaining with other 
federations and nations. This reduces the barriers to an enormous 
range of utility-maximizing transactions thereby producing an enor-
mous increase in social wealth. Many federations have been 
formed in part for this reason, including the United States, the Eu-
ropean Union, and the British Commonwealth, as well as all the 
trade-specific "federations" like the GAIT and NAFTA. 
A fifth advantage to international federations is that they can 
help regulate externalities that may be generated by the policies 
and laws of one member state upon other member states. As I ex-
plain in more detail below, these externalities can be both negative 
and positive, 54 and, in both situations, some type of federal or inter-
national action may sometimes be appropriate. A well-known ex-
ample of a problematic negative externality that could call for 
federal or international intervention occurs when one state pollutes 
the air or water of another and refuses to stop because all the costs 
of its otherwise beneficial action accrue to its neighbor.55 
54. See infra text accompanying notes 90-92. 
55. For a very interesting discussion of differing federal approaches in the United States 
and Germany to enviromnental issues, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Environmental Policy and 
Federal Structure: A Comparison of the United States and Germany, 41 V AND. L. REV. 1587 
(1994). 
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Sixth and finally,56 an advantage to international federation is 
that it may facilitate the protection of individual human rights. For 
reasons Madison explained in the Federalist Ten, 57 large govern-
mental structures may be more sensitive than smaller governmental 
structures to the problems of abuse of individual and minority 
rights.58 Remote federal legislatures or courts, like the U.S. Con-
gress and Supreme Court, sometimes can protect important individ-
ual rights when national or local entities might be unable to do so.s9 
As I have explained elsewhere, this argument remains a persuasive 
part of the case for augmented federal powers.60 
Some of the best arguments for centripetal international feder-
alism, then, resemble some of the best arguments for centrifugal 
devolutionary federalism: in both cases - and for differing reasons 
- federalism helps prevent bloodshed and war. It is no wonder, 
then, that we live in an age of federalism at both the international 
and subnational level. Under the right circumstances, federalism 
can help to promote peace, prosperity, and happiness. It can allevi-
ate the threat of majority tyranny - which is the central flaw of 
democracy. In some situations, it can reduce the visibility of dan-
gerous social fault lines, thereby preventing bloodshed and vio-
lence. This necessarily brief comparative, historical, and empirical 
survey of the world's experience with federalism amply demon-
strates the benefits at least of American-style small-state federal-
ism.61 In light of this evidence, the United States would be foolish 
indeed to abandon its federal system. 
56. There are many other advantages of international federations beyond these six, but 
the ones discussed are enough for my brief illustrative purposes here. 
57. THE FEDERAUST No. 10, supra note 29, at 77-84. 
58. See Calabresi, supra note 30, at 1404-10; see also SHAPIRO, supra note 46, at 50-57. 
59. See also THE FEDERAUST No. 43, at 277 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961} (explaining why the Union and union entities should umpire disputes between two 
states). 
60. See Calabresi, supra note 30, at 1404-10; infra text accompanying notes 93-97. 
61. As I explained above, Canadian- or Czech-style federalism is not as beneficial be-
cause it creates useless social conflict and gridlock in much the same way that proportional 
representation creates useless social conflict and gridlock in Western Europe, Israel, and 
Japan. 
Let me emphasize here that I am not saying that all social conflict is useless or that it is 
always better to make social divisions less visible. What I am saying is that some social 
divisions are so explosive and so likely to lead to useless violence and bloodshed that their 
unnecessary visibility becomes a constant threat to social happiness and ultimately to pro-
gress itself. As a general matter, I do not believe that anything useful ever has come out of 
social institutions that routinely and woodenly accentuate racial or linguistic or religious dif-
ferences and separateness. On the other hand, social movements or institutions that call 
attention to particular injustices done to individuals because of their race, linguistic back-
ground, or religion are highly useful, and the furthering of such movements and institutions is 
one of the highest callings one can pursue. 
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B. Economic and Political Science Arguments for Federalism 
We have seen that both historical and contemporary experience 
teach us that federalism, under certain circumstances, is valuable in 
practice. What theoretical explanations can be produced, then, to 
add analytical rigor to the normative case for federalism in the 
United States? Two of the social sciences, economics and political 
science, provide help here. Let us look at the case, drawn from 
both of these disciplines, for American federalism. Section 1 con-
siders the normative case for state government in this country. Sec-
tion 2 considers the normative case for the U.S. national 
government. And, section 3 considers the case for our joint state-
national federal structure as an integrated and working whole. 
1. The Argument for the States 
As a matter of pure theory, why should we not abolish the fifty 
states tomorrow? What purposes do they serve after 200 years 
given that we have grown together as a nation and as a people? 
The answers to these questions are suggested in three wonderful 
recent publications written by Professor David Shapiro,62 Professor 
Michael McConnell,63 and by Mr. Jacques LeBoeuf, assisted by my 
colleague Tom Merrill,64 as well as in a burgeoning, if overly ab-
62. See SHAPIRO, supra note 46, at 58-106. Professor Shapiro's important and outstand-
ing book grows out of his 1994 Rosenthal Lectures at the Northwestern University School of 
Law. In the dialectical fashion once used to great effect by his Harvard predecessor, Profes-
sor Henry Hart, Professor Shapiro first sets forth the case for strong national authority, then 
sets forth the case for federalism as a constraint on national authority, and, finally, discusses 
how to strike the balance. In the process, he produces a first-class masterpiece on the eco-
nomics of federalism. 
63. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. Cm. 
L. REv. 1484 (1987). McConnell offers a powerful summary of the case for decentralized 
political decisionmaking by state governments. His pithy account of what constitutes great 
constitutional scholarship is worth noting for the inspiration of all who write in the field: 
Great constitutional scholarship is ... attentive to the details of the document and true 
to its sources. But it also does something more (and this something is what makes con-
stitutional law a worthwhile scholarly enterprise): it makes the Constitution a window 
through which we learn about humankind as a political creature. The United States 
Constitution inspires reverence not just because it was drafted and ratified by our forefa-
thers, who were an uncommonly clever lot, but because it is the most successful attempt 
in history to construct a polity consistent with both the baser passions and the higher 
aspirations of its citizens. Studying the Constitution has some of the same intellectual 
delight as reading Aristotle: it opens the mind on a subject of the first importance. 
!d. at 1486. McConnell's article qualifies as "great" under this definition. 
64. See Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the Fed-
eral Commerce Power, 31 SAN Dmoo L. REv. 555 (1994) (article written by a recent graduate 
of Northwestern under Professor Merrill's supervision). This article does a superb job of 
presenting and treating the subject of the economics of federalism. 
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stract, literature on the economics of federalism.6s Let me recount 
the familiar but fundamental steps of the argument for state power: 
a. Responsiveness to Local Tastes and Conditions. The open-
ing argument for state power is that social tastes and preferences 
differ, that those differences correlate significantly with geography, 
and that social utility can be maximized if governmental units are 
small enough and powerful enough so that local laws can be 
adapted to local conditions, something the national government, 
with its uniform lawmaking power, is largely unable to do.66 Con-
sider here the following example offered by Professor McConnell: 
[A]ssume that there are only two states, with equal populations of 100 
each. Assume further that 70 percent of State A, and only 40 percent 
of State B, wish to outlaw smoking in public buildings. The others are 
opposed. If the decision is made on a national basis by a majority 
rule, 110 people will be pleased, and 90 displeased. If a separate deci-
sion is made by majorities in each state, 130 will be pleased, and only 
70 displeased. The level of satisfaction will be still greater if some 
smokers in State A decide to move to State B, and some anti-smokers 
in State B decide to move to State A.67 
As McConnell's example shows, federalism can produce, at least in 
some admittedly abstract situations, a net gain in social utility. This 
lends credence to the argument made above that federalism some-
times can alleviate the problem of raw majority rule, the key prob-
lem generated by democratic government. 
b. The Tiebout Model and Competition Among Jurisdictions. 
The second argument for state power follows ineluctably from the 
first. If social tastes and preferences differ and if states are allowed 
to exist and take those differences into account in passing laws, then 
the states will compete with one another to satisfy their citizens' 
preferences for public goods. An advantage to federalism then is 
that 
while unitary governments may have no means of determining their 
citizens' preferences for public goods, decentralized systems [do]. 
The necessary 'market type' preference-revelation mechanism was 
the citizens' ability to move freely among local jurisdictions. . . . 
[S]ocial welfare can be maximized by allowing citizens to choose from 
among a number of jurisdictions, each of which provides a different 
bundle of public goods.68 
65. Professor Shapiro summarizes and discusses the highpoints of this literature and of-
fers a useful selected bibliography. See SHAPIRO, supra note 46. 
66. See McConnell, supra note· 63, at 1493; see also SHAPIRO, supra note 46, at 91-94; 
LeBoeuf, supra note 64, at 558-59. 
67. McConnell, supra note 63, at 1494. 
68. LeBoeuf, supra note 64, at 560; see also Charles M. Tie bout, A Pure Theory of Local 
Expenditures, 64 J. PoL. EcoN. 416 (1956). 
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Because it often may be unclear what bundles of public goods are 
desirable at what cost, competition among jurisdictions holds out 
the potential for a market mechanism that can provide an empirical 
answer to the most important questions of governance.69 This argu-
ment has built into it two crucial assumptions: first, that the policies 
adopted by the states do not generate significant externalities, a 
point I come back to; and second, that there be free movement of 
capital and labor across state borders with no important residency 
requirements of any kind. Obviously, a right of exit is crucial to any 
competition among jurisdictions because it is that right that allows 
market discipline of those jurisdictions that provide less desirable 
bundles of public goods.7o Without a right of exit, a situation of 
jurisdictional monopoly prevails like that which exists under all uni-
tary national governments. 
Jurisdictional monopoly is conducive not only to a low-quality 
bundle of public goods; at the extreme, it could be said also to lead 
to the denial of fundamental individual liberties. Jurisdictional 
competition, then, is also beneficial because it leads to the protec-
tion of liberty. If I dislike the laws of my home state enough and 
feel tyrannized by them enough, I always can preserve my freedom 
by moving to a different state with less tyrannous laws. Some may 
think this liberty argument for federalism is just another form of the 
argument already made that federalism leads to competition in the 
provision of public goods. And, of course, if one wrongly believes 
that fundamental private liberties are "provided" by government as 
a public good, then these two points indeed do collapse into each 
other. In fact, however, it turns out that fundamental private liber-
ties are actually antecedent to govemment,71 and, therefore, the 
protection of those liberties through jurisdictional competition is a 
great and additional benefit of federalism. 
69. See SHAPIRO, supra note 46, at 78; LeBoeuf, supra note 64, at 559·61; see also 
McConnell, supra note 63, at 1498-500. Competition among states is limited importantly, 
however, by the fact that citizens must choose between bundles of public goods that are tied 
together. A citizen of New Hampshire who likes that state's tax rates but dislikes its criminal 
procedural rules may have to choose which issue matters more to him. The bundling of 
public goods together into only 50 packages limits the potential degree of personal choice 
and competition. Nonetheless, a choice among 50 bundles is still much better than only the 
option of one nationally uniform bundle which is all that is available to citizens of a central-
ized nation-state. 
70. See Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 
147 (1992). 
71. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness. - That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving 
their just powers from the Consent of the governed ..•• "). 
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c. Experimentation. The possibility of competition among ju-
risdictions creates incentives for each jurisdiction to provide bun-
dles of goods that will maximize utility for a majority of the voters 
in that jurisdiction. These bundles will not be the same, of course, 
because we have stipulated already that jurisdictional tastes and 
preferences differ, and, therefore, jurisdictional utility curves differ 
as well. Many jurisdictions will seek to maximize utility by trying to 
gain the tax dollars of residents and industry from other states. 
Some jurisdictions conceivably might put less emphasis on this par-
ticular goal so as to maintain a higher quality of life for current 
residents. 
In any event, the possibility of competition will lead inexorably 
·to experimentation and product differentiation.72 In a competitive 
situation, state governments, as competing sellers of bundles of 
public goods, must strive constantly to improve the desirability of 
their bundle lest they lose out. The end result is an incentive for 
state governments to experiment and improve. This is the point of 
Justice Brandeis's famous statement that: 
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave 
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with 
serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents 
of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic ex-
periments without risk to the rest of the country.73 
Competition leads inexorably to innovation and improvement. 
d. Improved Quality of Governmental Decisionmaking and 
Administration. Decentralized governments make better decisions 
than centralized ones for reasons additional to the whip they feel 
from competition. Decentralization ensures that "those responsible 
for choosing a given social policy are made aware of the costs of 
that policy."74 This helps ensure a more informed weighing of costs 
and benefits than often occurs at the national level where taxpayers 
often may be less cognizant of the social costs of particular 
legislation. 
In addition and just as importantly, governmental agency costs 
often may be lower at the state level than at the national level be-
72. See SHAPIRO, supra note 46, at 85-88; LeBoeuf, supra note 64, at 561-63; see also 
McConnell, supra note 63, at 1498. 
73. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932} (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
For a nice discussion of the laboratory perspective and how federalism structures competition 
in the political market, see Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: "Converse-1983" in 
Context, 47 V AND. L. REv. 1229, 1233-40 (1994). 
74. LeBoeuf, supra note 64, at 563. 
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cause monitoring costs may be lower where fewer programs, em-
ployees, and amounts of tax revenue are involved. The smaller size 
of the state governmental jurisdictions thus makes it far easier for 
citizens to exercise a greater and more effective degree of control 
over their government officials.1s For this reason, it often makes 
sense to lodge dangerous and intrusive police powers over crime 
and over controversial social issues in the states where government 
officials may be monitored more easily by the citizenry. 
Conversely, state governments also may find that they are able 
to enforce criminal laws and regulations of social mores less coer-
cively than the national government because of the lower costs and 
greater ease of monitoring citizen behavior in a smaller jurisdic-
tion.76 Indeed, ideally small jurisdictional size will lead to less pop-
ulous state legislative districts, thus producing a greater congruence 
between the mores of the legislators and of the people than can 
exist in a continental-sized national republic that necessarily must 
have enormously large legislative districts and other units of repre-
sentation.77 The greater congruence of mores between citizens and 
representatives in state governments in tum may produce greater 
civic mindedness and community spirit at the state levevs This 
might ameliorate the highly corrosive decline of public spiritedness 
at the national level that has occurred as a result of the current 
perception that there exists a discongruence of mores between 
members of Congress and the public. 
Finally, decentralization improves the quality of governmental 
decisionmaking by improving the information flow from the popu-
lace to the relevant government decisionmakers. Centralized com-
mand and control decisionmaking is often economically inefficient 
beyond a certain point in all social organizations. This point holds 
true for the military, for corporations that contract out for many 
goods and services, and for government as well. Large, multi-
layered bureaucracies cannot process information successfully.79 
Decentralization alleviates this crucial problem by leading to better 
informed decisionmaking. As our society and economy grow in 
complexity, the amount of information that government must pro-
75. See McConnell, supra note 63, at 1504. 
76. See id. at 1508-09. 
77. See id. at 1509-10. 
78. See id. at 1510. 
79. This sort of difficulty was at least partially instrumental in the breakdown of the large 
centralized government of the former Soviet Union. 
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cess increases as well.so This is why overly centralized, top-down 
command and control mechanisms are even less desirable in today's 
complex modem economy than they were during the Model-T era 
of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal. Ironically, the decentralized 
federalism of the horse-and-buggy era is better suited to the needs 
of our information economy than is the overly centralized, outmo-
ded nationalism of the New Deal. 
e. Prevents State and Local Attempts To Benefit One Region at 
the Expense of Another. One of the gravest dangers that could be-
set any large nation, particularly one as large and populous as the 
United States, is that one region or state or alliance of states might 
try systematically to gain benefits for itself while imposing the costs 
on other states or regions. Nothing could destroy more surely any 
large country over time than the tolerance of this type of internal 
redistributive robbery. Nation-states all over the world are plagued 
by tensions that are created when one region conCludes that this 
type of internal redistributive robbery is going on: indeed, tensions 
of this very type led to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia because 
the Slovaks believed they had been systematically abused in this 
way.sl 
Federalism greatly raises the costs of this type of regional redis-
tribution by forcing the states or regions to put together large and 
unstable coalitions that include the representatives of other states 
and regions if they wish to redistribute, .in geographically targeted 
ways, the national treasure. Moreover, as to a large range of issues 
left at the state governmental level, no such redistribution is even 
possible at all. Federalism thus protects against one of the chief 
dangers and sources of instability that any large government will 
face. By creating collective action problems, it makes more costly 
mutually disadvantageous attempts by communities to take advan-
tage of their neighbors. 82 
2. The Argument for the National Government 
Lest we all conclude that the Union should be dissolved forth-
with, consider now the very powerful economic and political science 
80. See generally THOMAS SOWEll, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS (1980) (arguing that 
decentralized social orders process dispersed information better than centralized social or-
ders); 1 FRIEDRICH HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION, AND LmERTY (1973) (same); 2 id. (1976) 
(same); 3 id. (1979) (same). 
81. See Langerova, supra note 41. 
82. See SHAPIRO, supra note 46, at 83-85; McConnell, supra note 63, at 1494-98. 
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arguments for the normative desirability of our national 
government. 
a. Economies of Scale. As already mentioned, there are many 
vital government activities that are characterized by the existence 
of increasing economies of scale.83 The provision of nuclear weap-
ons and national defense is an obvious and much-mentioned exam-
ple, but other such examples abound. Negotiation of trade 
agreements with foreign nations, ambassadorial and foreign policy 
apparatuses, large-scale transportation infrastructures, programs of 
space exploration and basic scientific and medical research, and 
programs to redistribute social wealth - all of these and more are 
examples of government-provided public goods that are cheaper 
when purchased in bulk than when purchased in smaller 
increments. 
The point is so easily and well understood that it need not be 
belabored. These vital public goods, public goods that we all have 
come to expect from government and that have contributed to 
enormous human progress,84 would be underproduced seriously by 
smaller governmental regimes, thereby reducing general social 
utility. 
b. Costs of Decentralization. Second, centralization and uni-
formity, under some circumstances, can reduce social costs. A sin-
gle national currency is cheaper to use than would be fifty state 
currencies. As a result, more exchanges occur causing enormous 
utility gains. A uniform national gauge for railway tracks similarly 
may produce general utility gains with minimal losses to the people 
of any one state. Sometimes variety is not the spice of life; as to 
some items it may be a downright nuisance and an expensive one at 
that. National government eliminates these potential deadweight 
social costs with general gains in social utility as a result.85 
In theory, of course, state governments always can negotiate 
over these issues with the goal of producing a uniform law code 
whenever the savings achieved by uniformity seem as if they would 
be great.86 In practice, however, it is costly for fifty state govern-
ments to negotiate such codes and costlier still to keep them up to 
83. See SHAPmo, supra note 46, at 46-50; LeBoeuf, supra note 64, at 565-66; see also 
McConnell, supra note 63, at 1494. 
84. For example, the extraordinary expansion in human knowledge and wealth that has 
occurred from 1492 to the present would not have been possible without the central govern-
ment financed exploration and scientific research. 
85. See SHAPmo, supra note 46, at 46-50. 
86. For a discussion of the uniform law model, see Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations 
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489 (1954). 
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date. Here again, centralization promotes general utility gains by 
eliminating those negotiation costs. Absent such costs, more uni-
form national laws will exist, and the presence of such laws may 
encourage greatly both commercial activity and leisure activity by 
making it cheaper to engage in. 87 
Particularly where government planning and wealth redistribu-
tion is involved, centralized government becomes an essential cost 
saver. State redistribution and planning are frustrated constantly 
by exit and competition;88 this is the flip side of the claim that feder-
alism preserves liberty. Thus, critics of federalism complain that it 
always produces a race to the bottom: the states end up competing 
with each other to impose the most minimal tax levels possible for 
the provision of vitally needed public goods. Thus, we are 
presented with a classic collective action problem. All states would 
agree to pay for these goods if they could be sure that by doing so 
they would not impoverish themselves to the benefit of their neigh-
bors, but, because they cannot be sure, they all end up with a 
suboptimal bundle of public goods. This is precisely the bind the 
thirteen original states found themselves in under the Articles of 
Confederation.89 Absent a central government, public goods were 
being underprovided because it was too costly for any one state to 
spend what was needed given the policy choices being made in 
other states. For this reason, a national role often will be appropri-
ate where redistribution concerns predominate. 
c. Externalities. The need for a national role in wealth redistri-
bution points to another powerful argument for centralized govern-
ment: the existence of externalities resulting from state 
governmental activity. Many important social benefits may be ob-
tained, with major net gains in utility, as a result of national regula-
tion that eliminates the external effects of state governmental 
activity.9° As Jacques LeBoeuf notes, "The problem of interjuris-
dictional spillovers was assumed away by Tiebout in his model of 
frl. A more complicated example is a uniform army, in place of 50 state militias. Not only 
are there increasing economies of scale here, there is also the cost saving that results from the 
fact that 50 armies might fight one another instead of a common enemy, whereas one army 
usually will not consume itself. 
88. But see Richard Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-
to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 
(1992) (disproving the race-to-the-bottom thesis in environmental law); Ralph K. Winter, 
Private Goals and Competition Among State Legal Systems, 6 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoLY. 127 
(1982) (disproving the race-to-the-bottom thesis in corporate and commercial law). 
89. See generally LeBoeuf, supra note 64, at 592-607. 
90. See SHAPmo, supra note 46, at 39-44; LeBoeuf, supra note 64, at 567-74; see also 
McConnell, supra note 63, at 1495. 
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interjurisdictional competition, but it is a pervasive feature of real-
ity."91 Externalities exist for present purposes whenever a state 
governmental policy, law, or activity imposes costs or confers bene-
fits on residents of other states. Imposition of costs is a negative 
externality; conferral of benefits is a positive externality. Absent a 
national government, the states will overindulge in activities that 
produce negative externalities and underindulge in activities that 
produce positive externalities. 
A few quick examples make this point clear. State A will pro-
duce too much air pollution if the costs of that pollution are borne 
significantly by the residents of State B while all the benefits of the 
polluting activity accrue to its own residents. A national govern-
ment perceiving this dilemma might intervene and bring State A's 
costs more nearly in line with the total social costs of the activity. 
Absent a national government, however, State A either will con-
tinue to produce excessive amounts of pollution or it will extract an 
unjustified rent from State B for ending the pollution or the situa-
tion will escalate to a conflict of a potentially violent sort if the 
residents of State B are aggrieved sufficiently to make that worth 
their while. 
As to positive externalities, consider the following case. State A 
invests heavily in education, a public good, only to find that the 
beneficiaries of that education routinely move out of state in dis-
proportionate numbers to escape its high tax rates which taxes pay 
for the education. State B, a low-tax state, benefits from this juris-
dictional flight as well-educated residents of A relocate to B. Re-
luctantly, State A concludes that it must cut back on its investment 
in public education because, due to federalism, it is unable to reap 
the full benefits of its investment, many of which are accruing to the 
freeloading residents of State B. State A thus ends up underinvest-
ing in education, a public good, because federalism prevents it from 
recouping on its investment.92 
91. LeBoeuf, supra note 64, at 567 (citation omitted). 
92. This hypothetical illustrates vividly the importance of time framing in determining 
whether a state policy has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. If your time frame is 
broad enough, then, as in my education example, there is an effect. Similarly, in Lopez, 
Justice Breyer used a very expansive time frame to justify his conclusion that schoolyard 
violence was a federal problem. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1659·62 (1995) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer's argument does not work on the facts of Lopez, however, 
where the proximate effects are local in place and current in time and where control over 
local schoolyards and local crime implicates policy areas traditionally reserved to state gov-
ernment All this shows is that it matters a lot where we start the story and where we end it. 
For a discussion of time framing in criminal law, see Mark Kellman, Interpretive Construction 
in the Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591 (1981). 
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These two classic and well-known situations demonstrate the 
nonnative value in many contexts of national lawmaking. The na-
tional government can prevent serious negative externalities caused 
by state governmental action by adopting policies that force the 
states generating those externalities to pay for the associated costs. 
Alternatively, in cases in which that is too difficult to do, the na-
tional government simply may occupy the field altogether and take 
over, itself, the provision of the relevant service or activity. Simi-
larly, the national government can subsidize state programs that 
generate positive externalities to ensure that they are provided at 
nationally optimal levels. Or it can provide those public goods it-
self, using national resources. 
In both situations, the nonnative case for the national govern-
ment is powerful and, in this ~stance, stronger than it was in 1937 
or 1787. The enormously greater size and complexity of the state 
economies and government and the added number of public goods 
needed today means that state lawmaking generates more positive 
and negative external effects than ever before. Moreover, there are 
today fifty state governments whose laws can have external effects, 
whereas in 1787 there were potentially only thirteen. In this re-
spect, at least, the nonnative case for centralization has grown 
stronger. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that not every external effect of 
state lawmaking can justify national intervention. Otherwise, the 
competition among states, with all its beneficial effects, would have 
to come to an end. Competition among states can work only if 
there are winners and losers, and this in tum means that, in some 
circumstances, it is legitimate for there to be external effects of one 
state's policies on other states. 
The answer, I think, is to acknowledge a national role in sup-
pressing external effects to further necessary redistributive con-
cerns, to prevent discrimination against minority groups, to prevent 
damage to the property or environment of other states, and to fur-
ther distinctively national interests stimulated by foreign policy or 
uniform law coordination concerns. A national role is not appro-
priate, however, where the external effects of state laws are there-
sult of the desire of state citizens to have their own social, cultural, 
and community fabrics or where state citizens seek to maintain a 
close local hold on local law enforcement functions. A national role 
also is not appropriate in implementing and administering redistrib-
utive programs if the result is to produce a large and unresponsive 
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bureaucracy. In these circumstances, national block grants adminis-
tered by the states may work much better. 
d. Protection of Minorities. Lastly, there is the powerful argu-
ment that a large and populous national government may protect 
unpopular minority groups more effectively than will a small homo-
geneous state government.93 This famous argument, made by 
James Madison in Federalist Ten, already has been thoroughly ex-
plained, so there is little more for me to say about it here.94 Con-
sider though, in passing, how the accuracy of Madison's predictions 
reinforce the truth of his arguments. Although Madison was writ-
ing about state majoritarian oppression of the rich,95 his arguments 
of 200 years ago describe with pinpoint accuracy our whole subse-
quent history of race relations in this country from the Civil War 
era, to the era of legal apartheid, and right on down to the present 
when we find most pressure for affirmative action coming from the 
federal level. 
The Madisonian argument for nationalism has proven true, as 
much as any argument from political science ever can. Indeed, it 
has proven so true that some reasonably question whether certain 
undeserving factions and minorities are too well protected at the 
federallevel.96 In Europe and around the world, we consistently 
observe international courts and quasi-legislative entities paying 
more attention to human rights concerns than do national courts 
and legislatures. The need to protect minority fundamental rights, 
then, constitutes an important component of the normative case for 
national power. 
3. Why Federalism Is Normatively More Appealing than Either 
Nationalism or Disunion 
The case for federalism over nationalism or disunion begins first 
with the observation that it may allow us to obtain the benefits of 
both worlds. There are plainly some decisions that are made best in 
a decentralized fashion and some that are made best in a central-
ized fashion. This is a truism of all forms of social activity, from the 
93. See SHAPmo, supra note 46, at 50-56; McConnell, supra note 63, at 1501; Calabresi, 
supra note 30, at 1403-10. 
94. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text. 
95. See THE FEDERAUST No. 10, supra note 29, at 84 ("A rage for paper money, for an 
abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other wicked project, will be 
less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular of it, in the same propor-
tion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district than an entire 
State."). 
96. See SHAPmo, supra note 46, at 79-81; McConnell, supra note 63, at 1495-98. 
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corporate world to the military to our own daily family lives.97 Fed-
eralism acknowledges this fundamental reality of human existence 
and provides institutional forms that may allow us, under some cir-
cumstances, to achieve at least some of the best of both worlds. 
This structure, no doubt, is one reason why an institution that grew 
up out of historical accident nonetheless continues to thrive. There 
may well be other forms American federalism could have taken, 
either more nationalist or more localist, but the American people 
and their elites do not seem very anxious to explore them. This 
could be simply a failure of imagination, but, more likely, it suggests 
that, most of the time, federalism gives us at least enough of the 
best of both worlds so that it is worth the costs of keeping it around. 
Those costs, of course, are not insubstantial. They include not 
only the actual out-of-pocket expense of two sets of government 
officials, along with their sometimes wacky ideas, but also the costs 
of coordination and lost accountability that inevitably accompany 
any multiplication in the number of governmental entities. On bal-
ance, however, it must be remembered that as a continental-sized 
nation, we need the benefits of federalism more than a small homo-
geneous nation like Britain, which may well be moving toward fed-
eralism itself. We are both more heterogeneous than Britain and, 
because of our geographical position, we are more in need of ex-
pensive national items with increasing economies of scale. Experi-
ence and theory both suggest that American federalism fits this 
country's needs quite nicely. 
Second, there is another important advantage to American fed-
eralism. With two levels of government, the citizenry, to some ex-
tent, can play each level off against the other with concomitant 
reductions in the agency costs of government. History teaches that 
government agency costs, even in a democracy, can become quite 
high. It is thus no accident that Americans have thought from the 
time of the founding onward that liberty would be preserved by 
having two levels of government that could serve as checks on one 
another.9s 
We have seen already that national government cannot be ex-
pected to process all dispersed social knowledge as if it were omni-
scient. Similarly, it cannot be expected to exercise total 
governmental power as if it were benign. "Power corrupts and ab-
97. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
98. See McConnell, supra note 63, at 1504-07. 
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solute power corrupts absolutely."99 A national government un-
checked by state power would be more rife with agency costs and 
more oppressive than the national government we have. The exist-
ence of the states as constitutionally indissoluble entities provides a 
vital bulwark from which citizens can organize against tyranny. As 
Andrzej Rapaczynski brilliantly has shown, the existence of state 
governments helps citizens solve the collective action problem of 
organizing against tyranny.1oo The states do help preserve freedom 
because they can rally citizens to the cause of freedom, helping to 
overcome the free rider problems that otherwise might cause na-
tional usurpations to go unchallenged by the "silent" majority of 
unorganized citizens.1o1 
Conversely, the national government can organize a "silent" 
majority of citizens against state oppression - as it did in 1861 or 
1964 - more effectively than could a loose confederation, military 
alliance, or free trade association. Constitutionally indissoluble na-
tional government also helps citizens to overcome collective action 
problems in fighting usurpation or tyranny at the state level. The 
success of the American Union in fighting might be contrasted here 
with Europe's inability to police Bosnia. It turns out that there is a 
great deal to be said for having "an indestructible Union, composed 
of indestructible States."102 Federalism, like the separation of pow-
ers, is a vital guarantor of liberty. 
I should be very clear that the advantages of federalism differ in 
this respect from the advantages of decentralization. Professors 
Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feely have challenged the recent 
Supreme Court renaissance of federalism by arguing that all the 
real benefits of what we call federalism are in fact benefits of decen-
tralization.lo3 They claim that a decentralized system with no con-
stitutional protection for state power and with redrawn state lines 
would yield the same benefits as the proponents of federalism claim 
99. Letter from Lord Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887), quoted in 
GER1RUDE HlMMELFARB, LoRD AcroN: A STUDY IN CoNSCIENCE AND Pouucs 160-61 
(1952). 
100. See Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Feder-
alism After Garcia, 1985 SuP. Cr. REv. 341. 
101. For a thoughtful description of some other ways in which states can preserve liberty, 
see Amar, supra note 73, at 1240-49.' 
102. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1968). For an argument that the Guaran-
tee Clause constitutionally protects the structures and autonomy of state government, see 
Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third 
Century, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1988). 
103. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feely, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neu-
rosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903 (1994). 
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for federalism. In so arguing, Rubin and Feely completely overlook 
the difference between our constitutionally mandated system of de-
centralization and a system like France's where decentralization is 
merely a policy option easily reversed - a matter of temporary 
national legislative grace. 
Rubin and Feely's argument is wrong, however, more funda-
mentally because it also totally overlooks the value of the states in 
helping citizens resolve the serious collective action problems that 
must be overcome to halt national usurpation. Admittedly, the 
state militias pose much less of a check on the U.S. Army than they 
did in 1787 or 1861, but, nonetheless, the tremendous constitution-
ally protected dispersion of political, law enforcement, and military 
resources in this country does check national power. Movements 
for social change and even U.S. presidential campaigns usually 
commence from some regional or state base and then spread across 
the country. This phenomenon should not surprise us. The consti-
tutionally indestructible states do play a useful role in lowering the 
costs of organizing to fight for change or to resist tyranny.104 Feder-
alism is about more than constitutionally mandated decentraliza-
tion, as important as it is that decentralization be mandated 
constitutionally and not merely an act of grace from our national 
overlords in Washington. Federalism is also about the fear of con-
centrated national power and the grave abuses of individual and 
minority rights to which that power can be put. This is why the 
advocates of federalism, ancient and modem, always have defended 
it as preserving liberty and protecting against tyranny. The advo-
cates of federalism are right, and Rubin and Feely are wrong. 
Finally, it might be objected that the arguments for state and 
national power listed above all cancel each other out - that each is 
just the flip side of the coin from the other. From this, it could be 
said that American Federalism is intellectually incoherent - that it 
is a mishmash of arguments invoked on behalf of policies favored 
for other reasons. Again, I respectfully must disagree. Broadly 
speaking, I think history, political science, and economics suggest a 
powerful case for national control over defense, foreign policy, free 
trade, minority protection, redistribution to keep the social peace, 
and certain environmental spillover effects. Conversely, I think his-
tory, political science, and economics suggest a powerful case for 
state control over social, cultural, educational, and community is-
sues, over nonredistributive aspects of domestic law, over law en-
104. See Rapaczynski, supra note 100. 
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forcement, and over the administration and adjudication of most 
questions of national and state law. There is a role in "Our Federal-
ism" for both the national and the state governments to play. The 
proper line of distinction between the two levels may not always be 
easy to discern, but it does exist. 
C. Assessing the Historical and Normative Case for Federalism 
We now have considered in sections A and B both the historical, 
empirical case for federalism and the normative, economic case for 
federalism. How should we assess the weight of these arguments? 
What conclusions are we led to with respect to the importance of 
federalism as a structural component of the American system of 
government? A few brief observations should seem almost obvious 
at this point. 
First, and probably counterintuitively, I should say that I think 
the historical case for American federalism is stronger than the eco-
nomic case. The economic case is more analytically rigorous, a fea-
ture that commends it to academics, but it rests on countless 
artificial assumptions that tum out to be highly relevant if not dis-
positive. The historical case, by contrast, rests on experience, and, 
while the past fortunately is not always predictive of the future, it 
remains the best predictor to which we mortals have ready access. 
Let us pause for a moment here to consider one key overlooked 
assumption in the economic model that history has shown is of dis-
positive importance. 
The normative economic case for federalism takes no account of 
geography. The normative case made for state government would 
work just as well if the "state entities" were initially segmented not 
territorially but by race, religion, or social class. Thus, one could 
hypothesize a regime in which people initially were assigned to one 
such "state" and freely could exit it and join other "states." There-
fore, virtually all of the economic benefits alleged to flow from state 
government still should obtain - under this model - absent terri-
toriality.105 Less absurdly, but still wrongly, the economic case for 
federalism appears to suggest that federalism will work equally well 
in Canada or the United States, the former Soviet Union or Swit-
zerland, or Yugoslavia or Australia. 
Obviously, as the economists would say, something is missing 
from the model. The economic model that we reviewed - the 
105. See LuPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SoCIETIES, supra note 32, at 43-44 (referring 
to nonterritorial European federalism based on the personality principle). 
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standard economic model used by lawyers - fails to mention the 
importance of territoriality and geography. As our historical exege-
sis demonstrates, however, federalism works best if there are both 
many jurisdictions, an economic point, and if there is not an ex-
treme territorial segmentation of socially competing and rivalrous 
groups, a federalism market-structure point. These points would be 
overlooked and an opportunity to refine the economic model 
missed, if we did not look first to history to see what actually has 
happened in practice. 
Analytical models are extremely useful, if sometimes daunting 
in their complexity, but we should not follow them over a cliff. It is 
vital, in this context as well as in others, that we study social institu-
tions and practices from both a historical comparative point of view 
and from an analytical social science point of view. Any other 
course of action is dangerous folly. 
Having said this, the historical comparative case and the eco-
nomic political science case for American federalism seem quite 
strong. No other feature of our governmental system can be so sys-
tematically defended. Our presidential-separation-of-powers, two-
party political system has not swept the global marketplace as has 
federalism.1°6 Nor has it been defended in as analytically rigorous a 
fashion as federalism can be defended, although some of us have 
tried to remedy this defect.l07 
Our Bill of Rights and system of judicial review have attracted 
more interest from "purchasers" in the global marketplace for pub-
lic law and governmental institutions. Moreover, many in this 
country have defended the desirability of those institutional struc-
tures in analytically rigorous ways. The problem here is that it is 
obvious that Bills of Rights and judicial review will go only so far in 
solving the serious problems of social heterogeneity - the ones 
that lead to civil war, secession, violence, and even genocide. As to 
these heavy-duty problems of social conflict, the fact is that territo-
106. See Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U. Cm. L. 
REv. 1479, 1505, 1515-16 (1994). 
It might be objected that federalism really has not swept the global marketplace, as I 
claim, because constitution-makers truly do not favor the halfway house of federalism but 
merely settle for it when it is the best they can get. Some might say this is what really hap-
pened in the United States in 17FJ7 or in Western Europe with the fonnation of the European 
Union. This claim, however, overlooks the fact that peoples of the United States in 1787 and 
of Europe today prefer a federalism halfway house even though their elites want much more 
centralization. The fact that the elites have agreed to Federalism as a concession thus does 
not weaken my argument that Federalism promotes social happiness in circumstances where 
national centralization would not. 
107. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 
ARK. L. REv. 23, 34 (1995). 
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rial federalism or confederalism provides the best hope. Judicial 
review cannot prevent more Bosnias or Northern Irelands; the crea-
tion of national and transnational federal entities can. A brief 
glance at the record of modem history and at current events sug-
gests that federalism is incomparably more important than judicial 
review, the Bill of Rights, or the separation of powers, as important 
as those things may be, and I think they are very important. 
The federal character of the American Constitution is thus by 
far its most important structural feature. The only difficult question 
is how to make sure that it is enforced vigorously and properly. 
II. ENFORCING AMERICAN FEDERALISM: THE CASE AGAINST 
RELIANCE ON THE POLITICAL BRANCHES 
For many years now, it has been the prevailing view both in the 
Supreme Court and the law schools that constitutional federalism 
guarantees should not be enforced judicially. The proponents of 
this modem antifederalist position do not deny explicitly that feder-
alism may be normatively beneficial - although they never choose 
to discuss its possible benefits. Nor do they deny that federalism is 
firmly if not unalterably rooted in the political structure of what we 
"still refer to as 'the Union.' "108 Rather, they deny that the federal 
system has "any legal substance, any core of constitutional right 
that courts" can or should enforce,l09 
For purposes of this Part, I want to focus directly on the claim of 
the modem antifederalists that the courts should not enforce the 
Constitution's federalism guarantees because the political branches 
can be relied upon to do that instead.11o This view has its roots, of 
course, in the nationalism of the New Deal,111 but it first reached 
academic fruition in 1954 in a seminal and still important article by 
Professor Herbert Wechsler.112 Wechsler argued powerfully that 
108. H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 19 VA. L. REv. 633, 
633 (1993). Powell recognizes that there is a strong argument for judicial enforcement of 
federalism on prudential grounds. 
109. CHARLEs L. BLACK, JR., PERSPECTIVES IN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 25, 29 (rev. ed. 
1970), quoted in Powell, supra note 108, at 633. 
110. The political science literature does not agree that normal politics can be relied upon 
to preserve federalist power-sharing bargains. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, 
The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of American Federalism, 41 V AND, L. REv. 
1355, 1359 (1994) (mentioning briefly the relevance here of the work of William Riker, Paul 
Peterson, and Samuel Beer). 
111. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (recognizing essentially no judi-
cially enforceable limits on the commerce power); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 
(1941) (expanding greatly the judicially recognized scope of commerce power). 
112. See Wechsler, supra note 8. 
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the political process in 1954 provided great protection to the states 
and state interests. He cited the existence of the U.S. Senate with 
its then-rigid seniority system, committees, and two-thirds vote re-
quirement to shut off states rights filibusters.n3 He also pointed to 
the then-malapportioned U.S. House of Representatives, which 
prior to Baker v. Carr, 114 overrepresented rural interests and gave 
state legislatures a free hand in decennial redistricting.11s And, fi-
nally, he pointed to the Electoral College, which forces presidential 
candidates to campaign state by state because of its system of 
winner-take-all allocation of state electoral votes.116 He concluded, 
perhaps not unreasonably at the time he was writing, that "the na-
tional political process in the United States ... is intrinsically well 
adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center on 
the domain of the states."117 
Professor Wechsler's analysis has been picked up in modern 
times and greatly elaborated by Professor Jesse H. Choper, whose 
seminal and very influential work on this subject11B was relied upon 
ultimately by a majority of the Supreme Court in Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.l19 Notwithstanding re-
spectful but firm academic criticism,12o Professor Choper's views 
contributed to the climate that led to the overruling of National 
League of Cities v. Usery121 and to the enshrinement in Garcia of 
the New Deal view that federalism was to be enforced politically 
and not in the courts.122 Professor Choper argued ardently and rig-
113. Id. at 547-48. 
114. 369 u.s. 186 (1962). 
115. See Wechsler, supra note 8, at 548-52. 
116. See id. at 552-58. 
117. Id. at 558. Some, however, think that even at that time, Wechsler's analysis was 
outdated. See John C. Pittenger, Garcia and the Political Safeguards of Federalism: Is there a 
Better Solution to the Conundrum of the Tenth Amendment?, Pusuus, Winter 1992, at 1, 2 
("Rereading Wechsler's essay thirty-eight years later, one is struck by how many develop-
ments, both constitutional and political, had already in 1954 undermined his position .... "). 
118. See CHOPER, supra note 8; Jesse H. Choper, Federalism and Judicial Review: An 
Update, 21 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 577 (1994); Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power 
VIS-a-VIS the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977). 
119. 469 U.S. 528, 551 n.ll, 554 n.18 (1985). 
120. See, e.g., Michael Boudin, Book Review, 67 VA. L. REv. 1251 (1981); Henry P. 
Monaghan, Book Review, 94 HARv. L. REv. 296 (1980); Lawrence G. Sager, Constitutional 
Triage, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 707 (1981) (book review). A frequent criticism has been that the 
system of judicial review that Choper defends seems counter to the constitutional text and is 
not the system we ever have had historically or that we have today. See REDISH, supra note 
8, at 6-20, 23-61; Martin H. Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial 
Review: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 15-23 (1987). 
121. 426 u.s. 833 (1976). 
122. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550. 
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orously for his federalism proposal - a proposal that explicitly 
would confine the federal courts to adjudicating only individual 
rights cases so as to harbor judicial prestige for use in this category 
of cases in which the federal courts are supposedly most needed. 
Choper noted the longstanding tradition that our Constitution is 
enforced by all three branches of the federal government, and he 
argued that it was most appropriate for the political branches to do 
the enforcing in federalism cases.123 He also updated Wechsler's 
arguments on the political safeguards of federalism124 and antici-
pated many of the counterarguments that might be made against his 
federalism proposal.125 It is appropriate that I dwell herein on Pro-
fessor Choper's views because he is the leading academic theorist 
and advocate of the academically dominant New Deal approach to 
federalism cases.126 To the extent it can be proved that he has 
erred, we may be confident that the whole New Deal legal aca-
demic tradition is in error as well. 
The first problem with the Wechsler-Choper analysis is that it 
seems wildly out of date in the political world of 1995. Maybe it 
was plausible for legal realists in the 1940s or in 1954 to look at the 
Congress and proclaim the existence of a state-dominated institu-
tion that only grudgingly approached the outer boundaries of na-
tional power. Not having been born at the time, I am perfectly 
willing to concede that in 1954, they may have had a point. But, 
today, in 1995, the realities of our political system look very differ-
ent. Cloture is now available in the Senate by a three-fifths vote on 
most matters, not two-thirds. Rural districts are no longer over-
represented in the U.S. House because the rule of one person, one 
vote for thirty years has forbidden this type of malapportion-
ment.127 State legislatures have far less power over representatives 
under redistricting than they did in 1954 because the national 
courts, for various reasons, often take the lead in redistricting. In-
deed, two thoughtful analysts of American politics attribute the 
1994 Republican sweep of the Congress, in part, to the effects of 
123. See CHoPER, supra note 8, at 235-40. 
124. See id. at 176-90. 
125. See id. at 211-58. 
126. As I have said already, this view is overwhelmingly dominant among law professors. 
See, e.g., Sotirios A. Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery: New Meaning For the Tenth 
Amendment?, 1976 SuP. Cr. REv. 161 (criticizing National League of Cities); see also BLACK, 
supra note 109 (noting that federalism is not legally enforceable); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE 
CoNSTITUTION IN TilE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 89, 196 (1994) (advocating a minimalist 
judicial role in federalism cases). 
127. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962}. 
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Reagan-Bush judicial redistricting of the_ U.S. House of Represent-
ativesP28 The once legendary congressional seniority system lies in 
tatters in the House and is under attack in the Senate. Finally, even 
presidential elections seem more plebiscitary and less state centered 
today because of the ubiquity of national television, the rise of in-
dependent personality-driven third parties, the collapse of tradi-
tional state-party political machines, and the substitution of 
primaries for state caucuses at the nomination stage.129 Just at the 
most superficial level, then, the Wechsler analysis seems positively 
quaint today, whatever its validity may have been in 1954.13° 
These preliminary observations seem confirmed when we note 
that many, although not all, Americans seem stunned by the range 
of issues the national government now routinely chooses to legislate 
upon: speed limits on state and local roads;131 setting a national 
drinking age, even though the Constitution explicitly gives the 
states exclusive power over the regulation of alcohol;132 Republican 
proposals in the Senate to make every crime committed with a gun 
a national offense;133 Democratic proposals to use midnight basket-
ball games in deterring teenage crime;134 and indiscriminate Repub-
lican proposals to federalize all of state tort law.135 All of these 
things and more suggest to many Americans a complete collapse of 
the ability of our national politicians to distinguish at all between 
state and federal matters, and both political parties are thoroughly 
to blame. 
Both analytically and impressionistically, the Wechsler-Choper 
view seems at least a little odd in the political world of today - an 
historical anomaly that no longer quite seems to fit. But, the flaw 
128. See MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC oF AMErucAN PoLITics 
1996, at xxxi (1995). 
129. In 1960, when John F. Kennedy was nominated there were only seven states that 
held primaries. See JAMES W. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 237 (1979). Today, a mere 
35 years later, the overwhelming majority of states hold primaries instead of caucuses. 
130. I should say here, as I think is obvious, that these particular changes have been a 
good thing for the country overall, whatever their significance for the Wechsler-Choper the-
ory of the political safeguards of federalism. 
131. See Stephen Chapman, Should Congress Be Telling You How Fast to Drive?, em. 
TRIB., June 4, 1995, at C3. 
132. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). Surprisingly, two friends of state 
government are thoroughly to blame for this particular atrocity. This law was signed by Pres-
ident Ronald Reagan and upheld as constitutional by Wtlliam H. Rehnquist. 
133. See William J. Eaton & Robert L. Jackson, Major Crime Bill Ok'd by Congress, L.A. 
TIMES, July 29, 1994, at Al. 
134. See Daniel J. Kelly, Crime Bill Failure, em. TRIB., Aug. 19, 1994, at N22. 
135. There may be a proper federalist case for some national regulation of product liabil-
ity law, see McConnell, supra note 63, at 1499. Many proposals discussed today, however, go 
well beyond this. 
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with their analysis is far graver than these first impressions may 
suggest. In three very important respects, the Wechsler-Choper 
view is hopelessly out of touch with the realities of the modern 
political process. First, it fails to take into account the influence of 
our campaign-finance system on the political process. Second, it 
fails to consider realistically the incentive structure national politi-
cians face. And, third, it fails to consider the possibility that the 
state governments have been corrupted systematically to the point 
that they now would sacrifice their self-interest if they did not favor 
a normatively undesirable expansion of national power. I take up 
each of these points in turn. 
First, the Wechsler-Choper analysis assumed a world in which 
senators primarily represent states and congressmen primarily rep-
resent their districts. Because of the political party system, state 
governments were powerful entities in the politics of most states136 
and had great say over the composition of congressional districts. 
That particular world has collapsed totally in the last twenty years, 
not only because of the weakening of the party system137 and the 
role of the national courts in redistricting, but also - and more 
importantly - because of our current system of financing national 
political campaigns. National political campaigns have become 
very expensive mainly because of the costs of paid advertising on 
television and the tremendous impact that advertising seems to 
have on modern voters. Under current law, the best source of 
money to pay for that vital television advertizing comes from polit-
ical action committees (PACs), which usually are linked to some 
wealthy and nationally prominent special interest or faction.13B 
Modern national political campaigns, then, require that the can-
didate spend a tremendous amount of his time raising money from 
national special interest PAC's. In fact, candidates spend most of 
their campaigning time doing precisely this, and they generally have 
achieved a very high reelection rate, by historical standards, as a 
result. Even in a revolutionary year like 1994, the overwhelming 
majority of incumbents who ran for reelection won,139 The cultiva-
tion of PAC constituencies and the pursuit of PAC money have be-
come an all important feature of modern national politics. State 
136. See Calabresi, supra note 106, at 1517-21; Steven G. Calabresi, Some Structural Con· 
sequences of the Increased Use of Ethics Probes as Political Weapons, 11 J.L. & Pouncs 521, 
526-28 (1995). 
137. See Calabresi, supra note 106, at 1517-21. 
138. See Michael J. Malbin, Campaign Financing Reform and the "Special Interests," Pus. 
INTEREST, Summer 1979, at 21 (discussing the role of PACs in campaign finance). 
139. See Charles M. Madigan, The Historic Shakeup, Cm. Trus., Nov. 10, 1994, at 1. 
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and local constituencies still count, of course, because that is where 
all the television advertising dollars ultimately must be spent to get 
their votes. But, the sad truth is that modem senators and repre-
sentatives really represent two constituencies: a national special in-
terest PAC constituency and their state or local district. 
This fact has major implications for the Choper federalism pro-
posal because national special interest PACs have no interest in fed-
eralism. Indeed, they positively dislike federalism to the extent it 
interferes with their narrowly conceived special interest goals. 
Union PACs, business PACs, feminist PACs, trial lawyer PACs, en-
vironmental PACs, and health care PACs all will favor or disfavor 
federalism precisely to the degree that it suits their substantive 
agenda in any given case. They have no institutional reasons to 
favor federalism and every incentive to scour the country looking 
for local congressional districts or small state Senate seats that can 
be "bought" cheaply so that they will have an advocate in Congress. 
This is why, as Walter Dellinger has pointed out to me, we have a 
Claude Pepper, who is the congressman from the AARP, a Don 
Edwards, who is the congressman from the ACLU, and so on.140 
The first and most serious problem, then, for the Choper feder-
alism proposal is that it is totally unrealistic in a national political 
culture in which special interest groups and PACs are as important 
a constituency as state and local voters. That this political culture is 
despicable goes without saying. Ironically, its growth has been fu-
eled mainly by the very expansion of national power that Choper 
would be loath to prevent! As the share of national GNP distrib-
uted by the federal government has gone up, it has become more 
and more vital for special interests to form national PACs to try to 
recover some portion of that share to promote their goals and self-
interest. · 
A second problem for the Choper federalism proposal, which is 
related to the first problem, is that it takes inadequate account of 
the incentive structure of Members of Congress and of the Presi-
dent. Choper rightly assumes that these national officers will be 
interested in reelection, but he wrongly assumes that their self-
interest will lead them to be attentive to federalism concerns voiced 
by state and local officials. Even leaving the pervasive influence of 
PAC money to one side,141 this analysis is wrong because it over-
looks the powerful personal stake that Members of Congress 
140. See Calabresi, supra note 107, at 64 n.105. 
141. There are a few PACs that attend to state and local government interests but they 
are dwarfed by the size of the national special interest PACs. 
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always will have in expanding national power. Every increase in 
national power and money is an increase in the size of the pool of 
resources or "pork" that the federal government gets to hand out. 
Because handing out "pork" goes over very well with the voters, 
expanding the size of the federal "pig" serves the personal, re-
electoral self-interest of every single Member of Congress, Republi-
can and Democrat alike. 
This point applies not merely to the expansion of national 
spending programs or the spending of national money borrowed 
from future citizens too young presently to vote.142 It applies just as 
surely to programs that test the outer limits of Congress's enumer-
ated powers. Pass a national speed limit, collect a donation from 
the insurance companies. Pass a national drinking age, collect a do-
nation from Mothers Against Drunk Driving. Every breach of the 
constitutional fabric becomes a new fundraising opportunity and a 
new television spot in one's campaign for reelection. How, in con-
trast, is a congressman helped by defending state and local preroga-
tives at the urging of a state or local official? Does that sound like 
the stuff of a good, snappy fifteen-second commercial or television 
news soundbite? Obviously, not. 
This congressional incentive to expand federal power is miti-
gated to some extent by an incentive to duck some tough questions 
by leaving them to the states or more often to the federal courts. In 
this fashion, Congress often avoids controversy and enhances the 
reelectoral prospects of its members. Nonetheless, this buck-
passing tendency may do little to protect state power because there 
is no likelihood that congressional buck passing will coincide in its 
results with the constitutional allocation of power. Indeed, Con-
gress well may choose to invade state prerogatives and engage in 
buck passing all at the same time. 
Third and finally, the Choper federalism proposal assumes that 
the political power that state and local governments have in the na-
tional political process will be used mainly to defend their state and 
local constitutional prerogatives. It assumes, in other words, that 
the self-interest of state and local officials can be harnessed toward 
a constitutionally useful end. Unfortunately, this assumption too 
breaks down upon analysis. 
142. These voters constitute, of course, the ultimate politically powerless group. See 
JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (calling for heightened judicial scrutiny 
of laws that disfavor politically powerless groups, a proposal that, in this context, becomes an 
argument for the Balanced Budget Amendment). 
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However valuable federalism may be for the citizenry at large, it 
is not always of value to state and local officials. To begin with, it is 
sometimes in the interest of state and local officials for them to pass 
the buck on the hardest problems of government by deferring to 
the folks in Washington, D.C. The exercise of power brings with it 
accountability and enemies, and politicians interested in reelection 
have no interest in being any more accountable than they have to 
be. While the exercise of power may have its gratifying moments 
and while many politicians may be motivated to some degree be-
nignly or otherwise by the desire to exercise power, the costs of 
exercising power are often very high. State governors and legisla-
tors may be very happy to let the national government have more 
power over education or tort law or criminal law, if, by doing so, 
they can pass the buck on these politically intractable problems to 
someone else.143 The Wechsler-Choper analysis fails to consider 
that state power in the national political processes will not always 
be used to protect the constitutional distribution of powers. In an 
important category of cases, it may well be used to undermine that 
distribution of powers rather than to reinforce it.144 
This problem becomes especially acute with respect to the mod-
em federal government, which redistributes enormous amounts of 
money daily both in the form of direct cash grants and in the form 
of allocated regulatory and statutory benefits and costs. In this dis-
mal real political world, the name of the game is not the preserva-
tion of state prerogatives. The name of the game is who can do the 
best job of siphoning off national treasure and resources for the 
benefit of state and local constituencies.145 The possibility of using 
national power to create state and local benefits, the costs of which 
are borne nationally, sets off a destructive competition for national 
resources in which everyone ends up with a higher than optimal 
level of national spending and power. No single state can stop this 
competition, however, for fear that all the others will continue to 
play a game that in toto is destructive to all concerned. The fifty 
state governments thus face a ferocious collective action problem 
143. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Eco-
nomic Theory of Regulation, 16 VA. L. REv. 265 {1990). 
144. See Kaden, supra note 8, at 867-68 {detailing the relationship between state and 
federal public administrators and the process through which "a state's views are increasingly 
represented by public officials with a direct stake in ever-expanding national programs, even 
if expansion entails greater regulation"). 
145. See McConnell, supra note 63, at 1494-98. There may be serious risks to state offi-
cials who waste political capital on trying to preserve state power or control over money, 
instead of focusing on how to get a bigger share of the federal pie that is being distributed. 
Such efforts may trigger the enmity of those who control distribution of the federal pie. 
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that leaves them with little incentive but to advocate many undesir-
able increases in national spending, regulation, and power. The 
political power that Wechsler and Choper say the states have over 
national politics often will not be used to promote constitutional 
federalism. Indeed, just the opposite may well be the case. 
These concerns help to explain why a thoughtful and important 
attempt to modernize the Wechsler-Choper thesis also fails to 
persuade. In a recent article, Professor Larry Kramer has argued 
that an assortment of unplanned structures have grown up over the 
past 200 years that link the fortunes of state and national 
officeholders.146 These unplanned structures include political par-
ties and the interdependent structure of the post-New Deal bureau-
cracy at the state and national levels. In Professor Kramer's view, 
these structures give state officeholders power and influence over 
the national political process. In his view, they significantly substi-
tute for the failed constitutional structures that the Framers thought 
- wrongly - would suffice to protect state power. 
Much of what Professor Kramer describes seems quite accurate, 
and he makes an important contribution to our understanding of 
American federalism. But, the problem again at the end of the day 
is the same one that exists with the Wechsler-Choper thesis. There 
is every reason to think that state officials will use the power they 
gain from political parties and cooperative administration to seek 
more national resources and programs that will benefit the citizens 
of their state. State officials have more of an incentive to obtain 
federal largesse than they have to preserve the constitutional struc-
ture and distribution of power. That structure benefits ordinary cit-
izens a great deal, but it does not necessarily help a state official get 
reelected. Moreover, to the extent that political parties tie together 
the fortunes of national and state officeholders, the effect may be as 
often to infuse national issues into state races as it is the other way 
around. In 1994, for example, Democrats lost scores of state legis-
lative seats and many gubernatorial seats because of voter dissatis-
faction with the performance in national office of President Clinton 
and former House Speaker Tom Foley. 
Professor Kramer is right that political parties create a very 
loose tying arrangement between national and state politicians. He 
overlooks, however, the fact that the national government is today 
the senior partner in this arrangement because it has the most 
power and money. Accordingly, the predominant effect of the 
146. See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1485 {1994}. 
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political parties' state-federal tie is to make national issues more 
important in state races and not the other way around.147 
In sum the Wechsler-Choper thesis is wrong, at least in today's 
political world, insofar as it assumes that national elected officials 
safely can be made the exclusive enforcers of constitutional federal-
ism guarantees. It turns out that once again Madison was right af-
ter all: "No man [should be] allowed to be a judge in his own 
cause. "148 
III. ENFORCING AMERICAN FEDERALISM: THE .CASE FOR 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
We have seen in Part I of this article that American federalism is 
enormously desirable as a normative matter. We also have seen in 
Part II that, contrary to the view of Professor Choper, we cannot 
rely upon the national political branches to enforce constitutional 
federalism guarantees. We thus are presented with the urgent ques-
tion of whether there is any institutional mechanism that will allow 
us to reap the enormous benefits that constitutional federalism 
promises. If there is not such an institution in the present Constitu-
tion - and there may well not be149 - then the promise offederal-
ism is truly an empty one, barring a constitutional amendment. 
The historical perception of the general citizenry always h~s 
been that constitutional federalism guarantees are enforced by the 
U.S. Supreme Court - backed up by the lower federal courts and 
state courts.150 Well-known and much discussed U.S. Supreme 
147. I know of no good way to prove this assertion empirically, and Professor Kramer's 
somewhat contrary assertion seems to me, as yet, unproved also. I do rely here, however, on 
my personal experience working in government and on presidential, senatorial, and congres-
sional campaigns. 
148. THE FEDERAUST No. 10, supra note 29, at 79; see also Steven G. calabresi & Gary 
Lawson, Foreword: Two Vzsions of the Nature of Man, 16 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoLY. 1 (1993) 
(discussing the importance Madison placed on harnessing self-interest toward publicly inter-
ested ends). 
149. See infra section III.C discussing the weaknesses of the national courts in this 
regard. 
150. Several of the Framers, including Madison, made statements to this effect, and, 
although they also anticipated that Congress would enforce federalism guarantees and be 
sensitive to federalism concerns, they did not think that absolved the Court from also being 
obligated to enforce enumerated powers. Chief Justice John Marshall, bitterly attacked for 
being an extreme nationalist in his day, never was so bold as to suggest that the Court should 
just abstain in federalism cases because after all the political branches were the first line of 
the federalism defense. Chief Justice Marshall's famous federalism opinions in McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 {1824), 
are merits decisions on the proper scope of the Sweeping Clause and the Commerce Clause. 
Moreover, as Richard Epstein powerfully has demonstrated, a return to Marshall's vision in 
Gibbons today would be revolutionary indeed. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of 
800 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 94:752 
Court decisions like McCulloch v. Maryland, 151 Gibbons v. 
Ogden,1sz United States v. E.G. Knight Co., 153 Hammer v. 
Daggenhart, 1s4 and United States v. Darby1ss all have helped to cre-
ate this impression and, even if we lawyers know that the Court's 
record has been spotty at best, the popular impression lingers. 
What then of the case for federal judicial umpiring of the balance of 
federal and state power? I take up this problem in three parts. Sec-
tion A considers the institutional competence of the national courts 
to decide federalism cases. Section B considers whether we need 
ever fear a crippling national judicial activism in this context di-
rected against the national government. And, lastly section C con-
siders the problem of whether national judicial enforcement of 
federalism guarantees is likely always to be so pathetically weak 
that we might do better having no pretense of federalism enforce-
ment at all. 
A. The Institutional Competence of the National Courts To 
Decide Federalism Cases 
It is frequently said that the federal courts lack the institutional 
competence to decide federalism cases of the enumerated power 
sort.156 As an initial matter, this is a very surprising assertion. We 
had such enforcement for 150 years prior to 1937 and until the 
somewhat unique crisis of the New Deal the system seemed to work 
in predictable, if not universally acclaimed, ways. While the New 
Deal 'Court crisis was very damaging both to the Supreme Court 
and probably also to President Roosevelt's post-1938 political pro-
gram, we need not conclude that one of the main preoccupations of 
the Supreme Court from the founding until the 1930s involved 
something that the Court institutionally was unable to do at all. 
This conclusion is certainly possible, but it seems less likely than 
other possible conclusions, such as that the 1930s Court erred in 
the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REv. 1387 (1987); see also Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional 
Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NoTRE DAME L. REv. (forthcoming 1995). 
151. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
152. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
153. 156 u.s. 1 (1895). 
154. 247 u.s. 251 (1918). 
155. 312 u.s. 657 (1941). 
156. Federal judicial enforcement of national prerogatives against the states, pursuant to 
the Supremacy Clause, is universally accepted. It is only when state prerogatives are at issue 
that federal judicial competence suddenly comes into question. 
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some important cases but that fact does not excuse New Deal ex-
cesses like Wickard v. Filbum.ls7 
The assertion of judicial incompetence in enumerated power 
federalism cases is also surprising because when we look closely at 
modem judicial doctrine we see that the Court routinely protects 
many federalism interests in a whole host of both controversial and 
largely uncontroversial ways. Professor David Shapiro provides a 
useful listing of these ways in his new book on federalism.158 Con-
sider here the rule of Murdock v. Memphis159 that the state courts 
are the final arbiters of state law; the Erie160 decision governing 
diversity cases; the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris;161 the 
growing willingness in recent years of the Court to limit 'federal 
habeas;162 the Court's continuing broad construction of the Elev-
enth Amendment so as to protect the states from federal judicial 
scrutiny;163 the Court's hesitancy to conclude that Congress has pre-
empted state law;164 the guarantee of Texas v. White16s that ours is 
an indestructible union of indestructible states; the guarantee of 
Coyle v. Smith166 holding that the states had residual powers as to a 
few questions on which their sovereignty is predominant; and, fi-
nally, the guarantee of New York v. United States167 that state law-
making functions cannot be drafted into service for purposes of 
federal lawmaking. 
· These rules and cases and a host of others all provide instances 
in which the Court widely is considered to be perfectly competent 
to protect and adjudicate the national-state balance of power. 
Some of the doctrines alluded to above are highly controversial; 
others are not controversial at all. But one thing surely seems clear. 
It is simply not true that the national courts generally are perceived 
as lacking the institutional competence to take federalism into ac-
count and to help preserve the national-state balance of power. 
That perception may arise in Commerce Clause cases but it does 
157. 317 u.s. 111 (1942). 
158. See SHAPIRO, supra note 46, at 1-3. 
159. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874). 
160. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
161. 401 u.s. 37 (1971). 
162. See SHAPIRO, supra note 46, at 2 & n.9 (collecting cases). 
163. See id. at 2 & n.10 (collecting cases). 
164. See id. at 3 & nn.11-12 (discussing Supreme Court preemption jurisprudence and 
collecting cases). 
165. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868). 
166. 221 u.s. 559 (1911). 
167. 112 S. Ct 2408 (1992). 
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not arise more generally. Is there then something peculiar about 
the Commerce Clause or about the list of powers more generally in 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution that suggests that the Court 
is incompetent to decide issues and cases arising under those parts 
of the Framers' Constitution? 
I submit there is not. Admittedly, the Commerce Clause raises 
serious interpretive problems, problems that are raised by the tax-
ing and spending power provisions as well.168 It is difficult to say 
with exactitude where interstate commerce ends and education or 
local law enforcement or wholly intrastate commerce begins. Any 
first-year law student can show by cumulating individually insignifi-
cant effects that any given congressional regulation of commerce 
rationally might be based on the belief that a state activity was gen-
erating significant external effects on other states and thus on inter-
state commerce. 
Similarly, it would be easy to run this analysis in reverse and 
show that all congressional exercises of the interstate commerce 
power were invalid because they significantly affect the exclusive 
power of the states over education or tort law or family law or local 
law enforcement. The New Deal Court was right in Wickard that if 
you follow the chain of causation far enough everything seems to 
affect everything else.169 This is not a profound observation or a 
novel insight. It certainly provides no excuse for the Court's refusal 
for the past fifty years ever to invalidate even a single tenuous, 
farfetched exercise of the commerce power even in cases such as 
Lopez in which Congress was bearing down very close to the re-
served power of the states over education and local law 
enforcement. 
There was no plausible claim in Lopez that external effects justi-
fied a national law. To the contrary, the effects of gun carrying 
within 1000 yards of a school are overwhelmingly local, which is 
why over forty170 states have laws against this practice. Carrying 
guns near a school is undoubtedly a national problem, as Justice 
Breyer argues powerfully in the dissent.171 But, it is not a federal 
problem.172 It is a problem that generates serious local costs and 
168. Professor McConnell offers an intriguing suggestion on the proper scope of the 
spending power. See McConnell, supra note 63, at 1497-98. He suggests that the power may 
allow spending for more than the enumerated purposes so long as it is for the general welfare 
of the country as a whole and not for the benefit of only one state or region. 
169. See Wickard v. FIIbum, 317 U.S. 111, 123-25, 128-29 {1942). 
170. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1641 {1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
171. See 115 S. Ct. at 1659-61. 
172. I am indebted to Akhil Amar for this point. 
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that only experimentation and innovation will help solve. The ex-
ternal effects on other states are minor when compared to the in-
state effect. 
Nothing in the exhaustive historical or economic case for feder-
alism canvassed in Part I above suggests that this is a problem that 
we need federal action to solve. On the other hand, there is much 
in that historical and normative case that suggests that education 
and local law enforcement are functions that we do well to leave to 
the states. There may be a case for federal subsidization of educa-
tion and local law enforcement through general appropriations bills 
because education and local law enforcement are public goods that 
the states may underprovide for various reasons. But, there is noth-
ing to be gained and much to be lost from allowing the federal be-
hemoth to get involved in matters as overwhelmingly local in their 
impact as the ones involved in Lopez. The historical and normative 
arguments against a federal law here are overwhelming: the value 
of experimentation among differing jurisdictional approaches to 
fighting juvenile crime; the danger to liberty of a national criminal 
law; the peculiar value of state control over the content of educa-
tion, both as a vehicle for reflecting cultural diversity and for fear of 
what a national power might do with education; the absence of seri-
ous negative externalities; the absence of any showing of increasing 
economies of scale; and on and on. The only thing that is surprising 
about Lopez is that it was a five-to-four decision. This is an incredi-
bly easy case of sloppy congressional usurpation of power. 
Well, what about the next case one might ask? If the Court 
starts down this road again, where should it stop? Do we follow 
Justice Thomas and Professor Epstein, who would restore the case 
law of 1937?173 Is that case law at all likely to work in modem 
circumstances, and, if it does not, what intermediate positions are 
there? 
One institutionalist judicial response might be the one that four 
out of five members of the Lopez majority adopted, which is to 
preserve the form of the New Deal doctrine, at least initially, but 
apply it with more bite. Under this approach the Court could strike 
down clear excesses like Lopez or Wickard, if it came up de novo 
today, while preserving such cases as Heart of Atlanta174 or Me-
173. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1648-51 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Epstein, The 
Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, supra note 150. 
174. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
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Clung17s or Darby,l76 which provided the foundation for much of 
the modem national law that regulates intrastate activities that gen-
erate severe external costs on the residents of other states. Does 
anyone doubt that the pre-1964 southern practice of racial discrimi-
nation generated severe negative externalities while benefitting the 
white majorities in the South? Of course not! Was it necessary and 
desirable as a practical matter to expunge that system so that any 
federal law targeted against it applied nationally and not only in the 
South. Yes, again. Reasoning analogically, on a case-by-case basis 
as first-year law students are taught to do, is there even the remot-
est resemblance between the severity of the negative externalities 
generated in Heart of Atlanta or Darby and those generated in Lo-
pez or Wickard? Of course not. 
We do not need a whole grand and unified theory of the scope 
of the commerce power to decide Lopez or to overrule Wickard, 
something the Lopez Court explicitly, conspicuously, and foolishly 
refused to doP7 It is enough to say that Lopez is not remotely a 
close case and that we will worry about the close ones when they 
come up and when a new body of Commerce Clause case law, in-
formed by the teachings of history and economics set forth in Part I 
of this article, has been assembled. If we still are worried, then we 
will defer to Congress because excessive restraint is less dangerous 
than excessive activism. But there was no reason for deference on 
the facts of Lopez and no reason for the Court's extreme show of 
respect for atrocities such as Wickard. Some assertions of the fed-
eral commerce power are truly beyond the pale, and this was one of 
them. 
In fact, the line-drawing and fact-finding problems here are no 
more difficult than they are in the context of determining what con-
stitutes an impermissible endorsement of religion or when an abor-
tion law violates the doctrinally recognized right to privacy or when 
unprotected obscenity becomes protected pornography. In these 
and a whole host of other similar situations, the Court does not 
think twice about promulgating nationally binding rules, minute in 
their detail, and concerning cultural, social, and religious matters on 
which people can and do quite validly and sincerely disagree. One 
would think it is on some of these contentious social issues that the 
Court should hesitate before it draws necessarily arbitrary and con-
troversial lines. One would think it is on these issues that the Court 
175. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
176. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1940). 
177. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. 
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might show some deference to the fact finding of democratic state 
legislatures, which are close to the people and attuned to their 
needs and preferences. 
This is all the more true when we remember that the Court rou-
tinely enforces the Commerce Clause in its negative "dormant" as-
pect, the aspect that is judicially enforceable against the states. 
Here the Court has no trouble invalidating state laws that generate 
significant negative externalities while upholding those that do 
not.178 Never in this context does the Court worry that it may have 
gone beyond its institutional competence by weighing and assessing 
the significance of the external effects of state laws. 
Why then should the Court worry about its competence to make 
precisely the same determination as a basis for deciding whether 
Congress has a Commerce Clause rationale that would support a 
national law? It seems to me, as it has to others,179 that the Court's 
dormant Commerce Clause case law belies the cries of judicial inca-
pacity here. The contexts are different and the case is strong for 
giving Congress deference where there is doubt, but still the paral-
lel is useful. 
Moreover, in this context, the commerce power is being used to 
nationalize state criminal law, a decision that is fraught with danger 
and controversy. This process of nationalization, which is rapidly 
gathering steam, threatens to have severe adverse consequences for 
liberty and for the crowded dockets of the federal courts, a matter 
on which the Supreme Court has special claims to institutional com-
petence. For this reason, too, the Court should not worry about its 
competence to decide cases like Lopez. What national entities 
know more about the costs and benefits of federalization of the 
criminal law than do the national courts? 
There is no very good argument to support the claim that the 
Court lacks institutional competence to enforce enumerated powers 
limitations against Congress. Indeed, this was one of its most visi-
ble activities for a long time, and it is an activity that many other 
federations expect their supreme courts or constitutional courts to 
play.180 The German Constitutional Court has no trouble enforcing 
178. For fascinating discussions, see Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 110; Farber & 
Hudec, supra note 24; Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Mak-
ing Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091 {1986). 
179. See, e.g., LeBoeuf, supra note 64, at 609-15. 
180. Historically, Canada and Australia, for example, have judicially enforced their ana-
logues to the Commerce Clause quite vigorously. See RICHARD E. JOHNSTON, THE EFFEcr 
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN AUSTRAUA, CANADA, AND THE 
UNITED STATES 233-78 {1969). 
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enumerated powers.1s1 Indeed, it appears that judicial review and 
federalism often go hand in hand all over the world. A major impe-
tus in the global spread of judicial review has been the need for cen-
tral judicial umpiring of federalism guarantees. 182 It is ridiculous to 
pretend that reasons of judicial capacity make the decision of cases 
like Lopez difficult. Whatever difficult interpretive problems the 
Commerce Clause raises, this is not one of them. 
B. Why the Fear of Judicial Activism Is Misplaced 
A fear that often is stated in this context is that national judicial 
enforcement of the Constitution's federalism guarantees will lead 
again to a crisis like the one that the Supreme Court narrowly es-
caped in 1937.183 Such a crisis presumably could occur on either 
one or both of the following two dimensions. It might involve a 
national judicial crippling of the vital functions and role of the na-
tional government, thereby seriously harming the interests of the 
United States. Alternatively, or additionally, it might involve as 
well the destruction or the permanent damaging of the Supreme 
Court's power of judicial review due to some fatal or near-fatal col-
lision with the political branches. Either of these concerns could 
present a reason for total judicial abstention in constitutional feder-
alism cases, if they had any basis in reality. 
To begin with, it seems unlikely in the near future that the Court 
again would get itself into as serious a bind as it found itself in 1937. 
Presumably, the Justices have learned from that experience and 
would be more deferential about repeatedly invalidating the popu-
lar program of a popular president during a major national crisis. 
In addition, no such major crises seem to be remotely on the hori-
zon anytime soon nor are we likely soon to have a President, 
backed up by a Congress of his own party, who is determined to 
take on the Court. History may repeat itself sometimes but rarely 
does it do so mechanically, and "generals" who assume such 
mechanical repetition of history usually are accused disparagingly 
of "fighting the last war." There is no prima facie reason to think 
that judicial enforcement of constitutional federalism inevitably will 
produce a train wreck any more than we should assume that judicial 
181. See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF TilE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 69-120 (1989). 
182. See MAuRo CAPPELLETII & WILLIAM CoHEN, COMPARATIVE CoNSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 10-11 (1979); see also ALLEN R. BREWER-CARIAS, JuDICIAL REVIEW IN CoMPARATIVE 
LAw (1989) (discussing contemporary trends toward constitutionalism, judicial review, and 
federalism). 
183. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. a. 1624, 1652 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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enforcement of the Due Process Clauses inevitably will produce a 
train wreck.184 
This being said, what are the chances that the national courts 
will seriously incapacitate the national government, preventing it 
from performing its vital constitutional functions? As Professor 
McConnell accurately has pointed out, "Of the two classes of judi-
cial error - striking down constitutional legislation and upholding 
unconstitutional legislation - the former is more dangerous since 
the political corrective is so much more difficult."185 This is espe-
cially true in this context because, as we have seen, there is a pow-
erful normative case to be made for national governmental power 
in situations in which there are economies of scale or in which state 
laws produce seriously disruptive externalities or in which minority 
rights are threatened. Improper or frequent Supreme Court invali-
dation of such vital national laws arguably might be worse, given 
the difficulty of correcting judicial errors, than adoption of Profes-
sor Choper's federalism proposal. Fortunately, there is absolutely 
no likelihood that this will happen. . 
The implausibility of this scenario is made clear if we stop and 
think for even a moment about the incentive structure faced by 
Supreme Court Justices and by federal judges in general. These 
powerful and prominent government officials are officers of the na-
tional government. They are picked essentially by the President or 
his aides, again national officers, and usually are confirmed in a pro 
forma fashion by the Senate.1s6 They receive very large national 
appropriations for their office space and staff, which can be reduced 
at any time by Congress. They work in Washington, D.C., live 
nearby, and have long since given up riding circuit, a practice that at 
least had the virtue of getting the Justices out of the Capital City. 
The Justices are accountable to liberal national journalists who 
cover the national courts and confer gushing praise on any jurist 
who does their bidding and biting scorn and sarcasm on those who 
refuse to go along. Their opinions are dissected in detail in national 
law reviews by law professors and law students at elite national 
184. But see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
185. McConnell, supra note 63, at 1487. 
186. Very rarely, the Senate will reject a nominee, usually when there is an important 
vacancy on the U.S. Supreme Court, but sometimes also when there is an important lower 
court vacancy as well. The Senate usually recovers from these exertions swiftly and confirms 
the next nominee post haste. This course of action allows a majority of the senators to be 
both against and in favor of whatever was controversial about the first nominee. Thus, for 
example, a majority of the Senate was both against Judge Bork and in favor of Justices 
Kennedy and Thomas. 
808 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:752 
schools from which they also must hire their law clerks. Should 
they ever hope to be promoted or receive a pay increase, they must 
look again to the national government from whence that promotion 
or pay raise must come. 
In sum, the Justices and judges of the U.S. federal courts are 
national officers in every possible sense of that term. Every good 
thing they have to hope for and every bad thing that they have to 
fear will happen to them as a result of some national political or 
social institution. Such Justices and judges are far more nationalis-
tic in their outlooks than Members of Congress or even federal bu-
reaucrats, who may have to deal personally with state and local 
officials on a regular basis. Thus, even national jurists who arrive 
on the federal bench from a state court soon may end up with a 
very nationalistic perspective on the world.187 
All of this federal judicial nationalism is not always a horrible 
thing, although obviously nationalism is an outlook that I do not 
share. But, it certainly does tend to suggest that the idea that the 
national courts somehow are going to go wild and cripple the na-
tional government is really pretty far-fetched. Why on earth would 
we expect an institution with a nationalist outlook to behave that 
way? Certainly not because that is what it usually has done in the 
past. To the contrary, the Supreme Court's past record is one of 
ferocious scrutiny of state laws and general deference to national 
ones. There is absolutely nothing, and I mean nothing, either in 
history or in the incentive structure faced by the Supreme Court to 
support the notion that there is any prospect that the Supreme 
Court is likely to cripple the federal government by construing its 
powers too narrowly.188 There is plenty of evidence, however, that 
if it ever does attempt to do any such thing Congress and the Presi-
dent will bring it to heel quite fast.ts9 
Consider thus the famous article written by Professor Robert 
Dahl of the Yale Political Science Department,19° Professor Dahl 
argues convincingly that the Supreme Court is powerless to resist 
the major policy objectives of lawmaking majorities. 
187. Without meaning to be critical, I would suggest that Justice Souter, like Justice 
Brennan before him, presents an example of this. 
188. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 110, at 1398 ("[N]ational courts are unlikely to 
have either the desire •.• or the opportunity •.. to restrain sustained congressional assertions 
of authority over the states."). 
189. See RoBERT G. McCLosKEY, THE AMERICAN SuPREME CoURT 113-20 {2d ed. 
1994). 
190. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as, a 
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PuB. L. 279 (1957). 
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The fact is ... that the policy views dominant on the Court are never 
for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the law-
making majorities of the United States. Consequently it would be un-
realistic to suppose that the Court would, for more than a few years at 
most, stand against any major alternatives sought by a lawmaking 
majority.191 
According to Dahl, this conclusion follows from the fact that, on 
average, a President can expect to appoint two new Justices per 
term in office. "[I]f this were not enough to tip the balance on a 
normally divided Court, he is almost certain to succeed in two 
terms."192 Given the President's power to appoint Justices, it is ex-
tremely unlikely that the Court ever will stray for very long from 
the view of national power held by a convinced majority of the na-
tional electorate. 
Moreover, even when the Court is determined to resist the pol-
icy objectives of a lawmaking majority, Dahl demonstrates that 
"Congress and the president do ,generally succeed in overcoming a 
hostile Court on major policy issues. "193 Dahl shows that when the 
Court strikes down a major national policy initiative, Congress and 
the President typically repass the law in defiance of the Court. 
These arguments, confirmed in recent scholarship, 194 constitute an 
important rebuttal to those who profess fear that national judicial 
activism someday might lead to a dangerous weakening of the con-
stitutional powers of the national government. 
At most, we are likely to get from the federal courts a federal-
ism second-look doctrine. Under such an approach, the courts 
might strike down a law the first time Congress passes it only to 
uphold substantially the same law if Congress passes it a second 
time. Such a second-look federalism doctrine poses no threat what-
soever to the national government, while holding out the possibility 
for real benefits by giving constitutional federalism guarantees at 
least some meaning. 
The fact of the matter is that to the extent that we rely for feder-
alism enforcement on the national courts, we are relying on a na-
tional umpire to resolve state-national disputes. It should come as 
no great surprise to anyone that, historically, national judicial um-
: . ~91. Id. at 285. 
192. Id. at 284. 
· , 193. Id. at 288. 
194. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 
S4 REv. Por.. 369 (1992); see also GERAlD N. RoSENBERG, THE HoLLOW HoPE: CAN 
CoURTS BRING ABoUT SoCIAL CHANGE? (1991). 
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piring has favored a}ld is likely to continue to favor claims of na-
tional power against the states. 
C. Why the Only Danger Is Excessive Judicial Deference 
The only realistic fear that anyone should entertain about na-
tional judicial enforcement of constitutional fed~ralism guarantees 
is that it may favor claims of national power so consistently as to be 
worse than no enforcement mechanism at all. This fear arises be-
cause the occasional judicial invalidation of some national excess 
may not do enough good to compensate for the harm that is done 
by giving the public a false sense of security that the courts really 
are enforcing the federal-state balance of power when, in fact, they 
are not doing so. 
The very real danger is that the Supreme Court will end up con-
ferring legitimacy on congressional and presidential usurpations of 
state power that might l:Je resisted more vigorously in the absence 
of federal judicial review. The advantages of constitutional federal-
ism will not be obtainable if the Court hands down decisions like 
Lopez only once every ten years. National judicial umpiring of fed-
eralism boundaries will be useful only if the courts invalidate usur-
pations with some frequency, thus justifying the public confidence 
that the judiciary really is doing its duty in this category of cases. 
Unfortunately, there is no good way to assess whether judicial 
enforcement of constitutional federalism guarantees can be made to 
be worth the costs in this regard. Recent history is not reassuring, 
and the incentive structure of national judges is less reassuring still. 
But, as a practical matter, there really is no better alternative out 
there on the horizon right now. We already have seen in Part II 
that there is no reason whatsoever to hope for congressional or 
presidential enforcement of federalism boundaries. The states 
themselves are powerless to provide enforcement, unless they sur-
prise us all and call a Constitutional Convention under Article V. 
Accordingly, for the moment at least, the situation we face suggests 
that it is going to have to be national judicial enforcement of feder-
alism or no enforcement at all. While the question is a close one, I 
think the better call is to encourage the national courts to do their 
best, while maintaining a drumbeat of pressure and scrutiny to try 
to keep them from falling down on the job too badly. That being 
said, there is no reason for optimism. Lopez probably offers little 
more than a glimmer of hope that the courts actually will resume 
doing their job in this area. 
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Real and effective enforcement of constitutional federalism 
guarantees would require a constitutional amendment that either 
would alter the composition of the Supreme Court or create some 
new federalism enforcement entity that was not stacked with na-
tional 11ffipires. So long as we must rely upon national umpires to 
resolve state-national disputes, we will be unable to obtain anything 
remotely resembling the full normative advantages of federalism 
outlined above in Part I. 
IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL CoMPETENCE OF THE SUPREME 
CoURT: Is THE CouRT BETTER AT ENFORCING THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT THAN IT Is AT 
ENFORCING CONSTITUTIONAL 
FEDERALISM? 
The conventional wisdom, accumulated over the past sixty 
years, is that Supreme Court judicial review is most needed and is 
most valuable in what sometimes misleadingly are called "individ-
ual rights cases."195 Here again, Professor Choper has provided 
one of the most intellectually rigorous and honest statements of the 
reigning constitutional orthodoxy - a set of viewpoints shared by 
virtually all law professors and judges alike.196 Professor Choper's 
argument is that judicial review is uniquely valuable in "individual 
rights cases" but that it is inherently fragile because its use gener-
ates intense controversy, thus drawing down the Supreme Court's 
institutional capital of popular support.197 Thus, Choper concludes 
that the Supreme Court should conserve its political capital by de-
ciding "individual rights cases" while leaving enumerated powers 
limitations to be enforced by the political branches.198 
Professor Choper's claim is one of comparative institutional 
competence: he thinks the Supreme Court is better at deciding "in- · 
dividual rights cases" and is needed more in that area than else-
where. If correct, this argument would provide a powerful 
195. This terminology, used by Professor Choper and many others, see CHoPER, supra 
note 8, at 169, presumes wrongly that federalism and separation of powers claims raised by 
individual litigants do not involve claims of individual right. For reasons well developed by 
others, I disagree. See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 8, at 3-6 ("[A]ny purported dichotomy be-
tween constitutional structure and constitutional rights is a dangerous and false one."). What 
Choper and others really mean when they use the label "individual rights claims" is: {1) 
.claims against state entities based on the Fourteenth Amendment or on Article I, § 10, or (2) 
where, only a federal entity is concerned, claims based on the Bill of Rights or on Article I, 
§ 9 or on some similar provision of the original Constitution. 
' 196. See CHoPER, supra note 8, at 60-128. 
• 197. See id. at 129-70. 
198. See id. at 169-70. 
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justification for Choper's proposal that the Court abstain from en-
forcing all federalism and separation of powers limitations and 
rules. The claim is not correct, at least as stated by Choper. 
First, we should reject Choper's general and misleading "indi-
vidual rights cases" label both because it is inadvertently tenden-
tious and because it overlooks and obscures a crucial and central 
distinction between claims against the national government and 
claims against a state government.199 I submit, for reasons ex-
plained in the margin, that what Professor Choper is really con-
cerned about might more accurately be called "Fourteenth 
Amendment cases"200 - cases that involve claims of individual 
right against state government or against state officials.201 Adjudi-
cation of these Fourteenth Amendment constitutional cases has be-
come the U.S. Supreme Court's central and most visible 
constitutional law preoccupation since the New Deal. Has this 
been entirely a good thing? Is Professor Choper right that the 
Supreme Court is really institutionally better at enforcing the Four-
teenth Amendment than it would be at enforcing the boundaries of 
constitutional federalism? 
The answer to these questions depends first on whether it is nor-
matively desirable that we nationalize each and every subject that 
has been nationalized by the Court in its Fourteenth Amendment 
case law and, second, on whether the Supreme Court in fact is best 
suited institutionally to be the national lawmaking agent on these 
199. Or, to be more precise: (1) individual rights claims against federal entities (based on 
the U.S. Constitution) and, on the other hand: (2) individual rights claims against state enti-
ties (based on the U.S. Constitution). 
200. I submit that both Professor Choper and I are really only interested in this second 
state category of U.S. constitutional claims for two reasons. First, this category is by far the 
larger and more important of the two. As everyone knows, the U.S. Supreme Court's "indi-
vidual rights law" overwhelmingly involves national judicial review of state laws and prac-
tices, in part, because the Court is afraid of Congress and the President but is not afraid to 
take on the states. Second, I submit the first federal category of U.S. constitutional claims are 
really federalism claims anyway. Claims against the national government that are based on 
the Bill of Rights or on Article I, § 9 or on other similar provisions of the original Constitu-
tion are really claims that the federal government lacks the enumerated power to take some 
action that bears down harshly on a particular litigant or group of litigants. This was the 
original understanding of the Bill of Rights, and, although we now think of the matter differ-
ently and use a different "rights talk" terminology to describe federal "individual rights" 
cases, the fact remains that analytically these are claims of "limited and enumerated" federal 
power just as Mr. Lopez's claim was a claim of "limited and enumerated" federal power. 
201. A few U.S. constitutional claims against state government are based not on the 
Fourteenth Amendment but instead on provisions in Article I, § 10 of the original Constitu-
tion. These individual rights claims, however, are not the ones that seem to interest Professor 
Choper. The "Fourteenth Amendment cases" label, which I use here, describes accurately 
enough the body of case law that Professor Choper and I are interested in. Remember that 
all state-level cases dealing with the incorporated Bill of Rights are, in fact, technically Four-
teenth Amendment cases. 
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matters. I take up these questions, respectively, in sections A and B 
below. I conclude only that Professor Choper is wrong when he 
claims that the Supreme Court has a comparative institutional ad-
vantage when it decides Fourteenth Amendment cases instead of 
enumerated powers cases. I do not mean to suggest, of course, that 
the Court should stop deciding Fourteenth Amendment cases nor 
would I deny that, on balance, the Court's Fourteenth Amendment 
case law has done far more good than bad. 
A. Have the Correct Subjects Been Nationalized Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment Given the Theoretical Case for 
Federalism Developed Above? 
For purposes of my argument here, I will assume that the legal 
materials of the Fourteenth Amendment are open-ended and inde-
terminate and that the Court therefore has substantial discretion to 
make national law while telling the public that it is interpreting the 
Constitution. I do not myself actually believe that the Amendment 
is this open-ended nor do I think that if it were that would consti-
tute a license for national judicial lawmaking.2o2 Nonetheless, I 
think it useful in this context to assume that the Court is so empow-
ered, as so many wrongly believe, and to ask whether, in light of 
this, the Court has used its power to nationalize issues wisely. I 
propose to consider this question by reviewing four key areas of 
Supreme Court nationalization under the Fourteenth Amendment 
in light of the comparative and economic arguments for and against 
nationalization developed in Part I. 
1. Political Rights 
Supreme Court decisions under the Fourteenth Amendment 
have been very successful when they have involved providing fed-
eral protection for the exercise of political rights in the states. Fed-
eralism theory explains and would predict this result for several 
reasons. Before I explain further, let me pause here to make clear 
more precisely what political rights are involved. Basically, they in-
clude the right to engage in political speech, publication, assembly, 
and petition, as well as the right to have electoral districts appor-
tioned according to the rule of one person, one vote. All of these 
202. As a matter of legal interpretation, I am largely persuaded that the original meaning 
of the Amendment is explained accurately in two recent law review articles. See Akhil Reed 
Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Founeenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992); John 
Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992). 
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are protected at the state level by a national Supreme Court inter-
pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The normative federalism case for a national rule here is over-
whelmingly strong for several reasons. First, state laws that dis-
criminate against political activities or that malapportion electoral 
districts will tend greatly to entrench some current state majority 
against competition from current state minorities. In such a situa-
tion, it becomes easy, indeed it becomes likely, that the current 
state majority will discriminate more harshly against the current 
state minority because the self-dealing majority will be much more 
thoroughly and permanently entrenched. This situation is likely to 
cause severe external negative effects on the residents of other 
states. 
First, it is not unlikely that a group that is a minority in one state 
might be a majority in another. If so, laws that abridge political 
rights and close off the political process in one state may annoy 
greatly the citizens of other states who may identify with or be 
members of the abused minority group. This will create needless 
tension in the federation - tension that can be avoided if a na-
tional rule keeps open the democratic political processes of the 
states. The negative externalities generated then by state discrimi-
nation justify normatively a national rule. 
Second, national political process rules ultimately may make it 
easier to leave more areas of substantive lawmaking to the states. 
If the state political processes are open and less subject to self-
dealing, they should produce better laws of all kinds - particularly 
better laws that will generate fewer negative external effects for 
other states. Fewer such laws means less of a need for national pre-
emptive law and more scope for variety and competition in the sub-
stance of state laws. Because this is normatively desirable in and of 
itself, this becomes a separate argument for a national judicial rule 
protecting political process rights. 
Third, such a national rule makes sense because of the 
Madisonian Federalist Ten203 argument that state political processes 
are more likely to discriminate against minority groups than are 
federal processes. Because state discrimination against a minority 
group that closed up the political processes would be fearsomely 
difficult to undo, it makes sense to use federal power to keep the 
political processes of change open at the state level. This core in-
sight from the theory of federalism should help us to appreciate 
203. THE FEDERAUsr No. 10 (James Madison). 
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better why John Hart Ely's theory of federal judicial review of state 
laws in fact has so much intuitive appeal.204 
In sum, the normative case is overpowering for national protec-
tion of political speech, of other related political rights, and of fairly 
apportioned - one person, one vote - legislative districts. This 
perhaps helps explain why the Supreme Court has found itself al-
ways on the most solid ground politically in cases like Reynolds v. 
Sims205 in which it was enforcing rights of political participation 
against the states.2o6 
2. Antidiscrimination Rights 
A second area in which Supreme Court decisions under the 
Fourteenth Amendment have been very successful involves the 
Court's enforcement of the antidiscrimination principle of the Four-
teenth Amendment. This principle, which is popularly identified 
with the Equal Protection Clause,2°7 is used to invalidate state clas-
sifications based on race, national origin, gender, illegitimacy, or 
some other forbidden classification. Great equal protection victo-
ries include, of course, Brown v. Board of Education, 208 Loving v. 
Virginia, 209 Frontiero v. Richardson, 210 and many others. Some of 
the Court's greatest and most historic victories have come in this 
area. 
Here again, the normative federalism theory case for a national 
rule is quite strong. State laws that discriminate against minority 
groups will tend to generate severe out-of-state negative externali-
ties. The apartheid laws of the old South raised a big federalism 
problem, aside from the local and state injustice that was perpe-
trated. Thus, race relations in the nonsouthern states were affected 
adversely; enormous waves of political refugees from the South 
204. See ELY, supra note 142; see also Calabresi, supra note 30. 
205. 377 u.s. 533 (1964). 
206. Ironically, the best legal arguments in support of the Court's case law on reappor-
tionment and its case law on the protection of political rights against the states more gener-
ally may be based on the Guarantee Clause of Article IV. See U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 4; see 
also BoRK, supra note 18, at 84-87; ELY, supra note 142, at 122-23; Vikram David Amar, Jury 
Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CoRNELL L. Rsv. 203, 222-42 (1995) 
(developing a Fifteenth Amendment argument for federal protection from state discrimina-
tion against the political right of jury service). 
207. For a clever and persuasive argument that the Supreme Court found the right equal-
ity principle but attached it to the wrong clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see 
Harrison, supra note 202. 
208. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
209. 388 u.s. 1 (1967). 
210. 411 u.s. 677 (1973). 
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moved permanently north and west; and national trade, commerce, 
and the free flow of goods throughout the nation all were severely 
impaired. To the extent that national equal protection law has 
helped to override and eliminate the state laws that generated such 
severe negative externalities, it is not only consistent with but is 
mandated by the theory of federalism laid out above in Part I. Na-
tional equal protection law has prevented state majorities from en-
acting legislation to benefit themselves while imposing huge costs 
on disenfranchised voters living out of state. It is no wonder, then, 
that such laws have proved to be very popular. 
Southern apartheid also created serious foreign policy problems 
for the United States during the Cold War era when we were com-
peting with the Soviet Union for the hearts and minds of many 
leaders of third world countries. It was embarrassing to say the 
least that emissaries from those countries could not travel freely 
throughout the United States or even to Washington, D.C. and be 
assured that they would be able to find a hotel room or eat in a 
restaurant. This, too, then provided a federalism rationale for na-
tional laws against discrimination, including laws against private 
discriminati0n.211 
A second normative federalism argument for the Supreme 
Court's equal protection case law stems obviously from Madison's 
Federalist Ten. 212 Here again, national judicial protection against 
state discrimination seems quite consistent with, if not compelled 
by, the theory of federalism developed above.213 
In addition, none of the federalism theory arguments for state 
power turn out to have much application here. No point is served 
by state competition in discriminatory laws nor is this an area where 
one would want to encourage different states to indulge their differ-
ent illegitimate preferences. Decentralization produces no saving 
efficiencies but does generate many severe external costs. There is 
simply no normative case for letting the sates have power over the 
making of suspect classifications, and there is a very strong norma-
tive case for national review and invalidation of such classifications. 
The powerful normative federalist case for the Supreme Court's an-
211. See Mary Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REv. 61 
(1988). 
212. THE FEDERAUST No. 10 (James Madison). 
213. It could be argued that the Federalist Ten does not support a national role in combat-
ing gender discrimination because women constitute a majority of the population. Given the 
extent, however, to which women historically were shut out of politics and given the lingering 
effects of that history, I think it is a mistake to conclude that they are not functionally like a 
minority group for these purposes. 
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tidiscrimination case law, at least as it stands to date, no doubt 
again helps us understand why that case law has been so uniquely 
popular. 
Before closing out this brief discussion of antidiscrimination 
rights, I should note that some national judicial enforcement of the 
Takings Clause, the Contract Clause, and the bar on regulatory tak-
ings may be warranted given the antidiscrimination principle. 
Those deceptively substantive cl~uses actually protect a particular 
social class of property holders from being forced disproportion-
ately to bear general social costs. In this sense, then, Takings and 
Contract Clause doctrine are simply a particularized economic form 
of broader antidiscrimination doctrine. To the extent, then, that 
there is a general federalism case for national antidiscrimination 
doctrine there also might be such a case for Takings and Contract 
Clause doctrine. 
3. Criminal Procedural Rights 
In the two areas of Fourteenth Amendment law considered so 
far, we saw that there was a strong case for a national role. We also 
saw that the Supreme Court as the agent of national control in 
those areas generally has enjoyed great political success. We tum 
now to the two areas of Fourteenth Amendment law that have not 
been such a success, in my judgment, the first of these is constitu-
tional criminal procedure. 
The Warren Court is almost entirely responsible for the expan-
sion and nationalization of our law of criminal procedure. With its 
decisions applying national Bill-of-Rights-derived criminal proce-
dure and sometimes civil procedure to all state proceedings, the 
Court swept aside numerous conflicting rules and imposed some ex-
pansive and nationally uniform rules, many of which have turned 
out to be both unpopular and of questionable wisdom. Problematic 
rules, like the exclusionary rule, which had gone unnoticed prior to 
their imposition at the state level, suddenly became major items of 
popular controversy. Although a few innovations were received 
well enough, the bulk of them were resented bitterly and gave the 
Warren Court its politically lethal image of being "soft on crime." 
Putting the merits of both that label and of the Warren Court's 
procedural innovations aside, there was and is no good reason for a 
set of uniform, expansive, national rules on state criminal proce-
dure. The normative theory of federalism suggests that nationaliza-
tion was inappropriate here except to the extent it was necessary to 
make sure facially neutral state rules were not being used to achieve 
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racially discriminatory results. Because the Warren Court did far 
more than try to make state criminal procedure nondiscriminatory, 
it got itself into a great deal of trouble - trouble from which the 
Court still has not extricated itself fully even after twenty-six years 
of trying. 
There is no normative national case for federalizing all of state 
criminal procedure through adoption of a very expansive set of 
rules. No appreciable economies of scale or efficiencies are gener-
ated by such a uniform code. While a few law enforcement officers 
may save time as a result of these nationally uniform rules, these 
minor savings are offset because criminals probably benefit from 
the existence of such rules as well. More importantly, state criminal 
procedure, so long as it is nondiscriminatory, generates few, if any, 
serious externalities. By and large, the effects of a state's criminal 
procedure fall within its own borders and upon its own citizens. 
Consequently, there is little reason to fear in this area that state 
political processes will be corrupted by some process of imposing 
out-of-state costs for in-state gains. Most individual criminal de-
fendants either will be state residents or will have committed of-
fenses in-state. It is hard to see how the procedure used to 
prosecute them could have serious negative external effects, unless 
they were discriminatory. Out-of-state corporate defendants in the-
ory could be victimized by unfair state criminal procedures, and, if 
they were, this might necessitate a national rule. But, this was not 
the problem the Warren Court was addressing, and the criminal 
procedure problem the Warren Court was addressing was not a na-
tional problem. 
To elaborate further, the normative arguments for state power 
are very cogent in the field of state criminal procedure. So long as 
there is a federal floor requiring that state criminal procedures be 
fundamentally fair, as there was prior to the Warren Court,214 there 
is every reason in the world for us to encourage some degree of 
competition among the states in criminal procedure. The law of 
criminal procedure has been evolving in the common law world and 
in the civil law world for centuries. The Warren Court foolishly 
stopped that process by constitutionalizing and nationalizing an un-
usually expansive set of 1960s-era common law rules that never 
should have been set in stone. The end result was a body of very 
rigid and not very sensible law imposed on the law enforcement 
214. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67-68 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)~ 
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officers and people of all fifty states,- unchangeable even by 
Congress. 
A better solution would have been to recognize that different 
states have crime problems of different severity. They might wish 
to respond to these different problems in different ways, which is 
desirable and logical. Some states even may wish to emulate the 
criminal procedure of other advanced countries like England, Italy, 
France, or Germany. There would have been no harm in this, and 
potentially, much good could have resulted. States with successful 
responses would have been likely to attract tax revenue from busi-
nesses and citizens, thus creating an incentive for other states to 
follow their lead. Thus, a decentralized competitive market in com-
peting state criminal procedures might have lead to greater levels of 
citizen satisfaction and reduced levels of crime.21s 
Had the Warren Court rules not been so expansive and sweep-
ing, nationalization would have had few undesirable policy conse-
quences. The combination, however, of bad substantive rules and 
nationalization was a mistake. It is a mistake that the public still 
resents, that the Court still struggles with, and that is resolvable in 
the end only by cutting back on the scope of the bad and overly 
expansive national rules. When the Warren Court adopted those 
rules, the need to protect minorities in the South from hidden dis-
crimination in court well might have justified the costs of overly 
expansive nationalization. Today that is no longer the case. The 
costs of our criminal procedure in added crime fall heavily on mi-
nority communities and on majority communities alike. The 
Warren Court's criminal procedure case law should be cut back. 
4. Social and Cultural Rights: Herein of Religion and 
Substantive Due Process 
I tum now to the final area of Supreme Court national lawmak-
ing under the Fourteenth Amendment. This area involves social 
and cultural rights, matters of religion and of substantive due pro-
215. Criminal procedure rules often are justified as necessary to protect innocent citizens 
from overintrusive and oppressive state-law enforcement actions. If the states were allowed 
to handle these problems themselves, however, citizens could leave states that adopted crimi-
nal procedure rules that produce overly harsh results. Thus, the creation of a decentralized 
competitive market in criminal procedure rules would allow innocent citizens ultimately to 
shape the development of criminal procedure by voting with their feet. 
One noteworthy imperfection in such a market is that state policies on criminal procedure 
may be "bundled" with many other state policies thus reducing the likelihood of exit due to 
disagreement with a state's criminal procedure issues. On the other hand, to the extent that 
state criminal procedure codes generate few externalities, there is little reason to fear a 
breakdown in the state political processes such that a national rule would be required. 
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cess. It is in this area, even more than in the area of criminal proce-
dure, that the Supreme Court recently has found itself trapped in a 
political thicket. Roaring national culture wars have stormed 
around its substantive due process decisions on matters of social 
and cultural rights. I wish to try to explain this by examining first, 
when it is problematic for the Court to make national law in this 
area, and second, when it is not. 
The basic problem the Court runs into in its national lawmaking 
in this area is hinted at when we remember that most federations 
around the world tend to reserve precisely these questions for state-
level decision. Cultural issues, educational issues, language matters, 
and religious questions - all of these tend in many federations to 
be reserved for subnationallawmaking.216 The reasons for this are 
not hard to discern. Any country heterogeneous enough to require 
a federal government is likely also to be geographically heterogene-
ous with respect to social, cultural, and religious issues. If so, that 
geographical heterogeneity is highly likely to manifest itself in a 
lack of federal consensus on those issues. One common way of 
handling such a lack of consensus is to create an economic and de-
fense union but leave ·social, cultural, and religious questions to be 
decided at the subunion governmental level. This indeed is what 
the Framers of our own Constitution did with great success until the 
modern Supreme Court began chipping away at their edifice. 
Few things are more divisive in a large heterogeneous federa-
tion than national lawmaking on social, cultural, and religious is-
sues. In a society that is heterogeneous enough, such lawmaking 
may well set off a civil war or an attempt at secession. Social, cul-
tural, and religious national lawmaking is especially likely to be-
come more controversial as it becomes more and more detailed. 
Such detailed rules will grate on more subcultures and often will 
produce more resentment. This is especially likely to be the case in 
situations in which the national lawmaking institution has poor ac-
cess to information and facts and where it obstinately and rigidly 
refuses to change its mind when challenged. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has faced exactly this problem with 
some of its lawmaking on social and cultural matters and on matters 
of religion and substantive due process. While some areas of its 
case law have been a political although not a legal success, others 
have embroiled the Court and the nation in horrible and often uri-, 
216. For example, § 33 of the Canadian Constitution allows the provinces to control' 
many of these issues. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHIS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF. 
POLmCAL DISCOURSE 39 (1991). 
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necessary disputes. What then does federalism theory suggest 
about when, if at all, one should nationalize rules on social and cul-
tural matters? 
First, the economies of scale and efficiencies gained by national 
lawmaking on these matters are relatively small, though not insig-
nificant. There is certainly some benefit for some citizens to having 
one easily known national rule on abortion or on the display of 
holiday creches. But that benefit exists for some citizens at a very 
substantial cost for others. 
Thrning next to external effects, there may be at the margin 
some serious negative external effects from state laws on culture or 
religion that differ radically and fundamentally from the national 
norm. Thus, a law in one state allowing polygamy when all the sur-
rounding states are committed firmly to monogamy might generate 
such serious external effects that a federalism rationale would exist 
to suppress it. On the other hand, a law in one state allowing abor-
tion only in the first trimester when many surrounding states allow 
it all the way through the second, in my judgment, would not gener-
ate such problems. That is not to say that some negative externali-
ties are not generated; obviously some are. They just are not very 
severe, at least not compared with the polygamy example men-
tioned above. Most state social and cultural laws ordinarily will not 
generate severe negative externalities, unless they deviate in radical 
and fundamental ways from the national norm. 
Some state social and cultural laws may discriminate against 
religious minorities or against other minorities and thus may violate 
the antidiscrimination principle. National lawmaking thus may be 
justified at times in this area on the Federalist Ten211 rationale. 
State laws that prohibit the free exercise of religion should fall for 
this reason, as should any other significant discriminatory state ac-
tion based on religion or religious affiliation. On the other hand, 
not every state attempt to preserve and endorse its own social and 
cultural tradition should be invalidated just because other social 
and cultural traditions also are not endorsed. Rigid and mechanical 
application of antidiscrimination principles here would render it im-
possible for differing states to preserve differing social and cultural 
traditions. This in tum would make true federalism both impossible 
and pointless. Imagine the reaction in Quebec or Catalonia or 
French-speaking Switzerland if differing cultures could not be pre-
s,erved, celebrated, ·and recognized without running afoul of equal 
217. THE FEDERAUST No. 10 (James Madison). 
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protection ideas. On the flip side of the equation, federalism could 
not be sustained if the Quebecois seriously discriminated against 
Albertans, for example, in employment or if Catalans did the same 
thing to Andalusian Spaniards. 
The case for nationalizing social and cultural matters is not neg-
ligible, but it has its limits. What of the case for denationalizing 
some social and cultural matters? Here the arguments for devolu-
tionary federalism seem quite strong. First, state autonomy may al-
low respect for important territorial and regional differences. In 
addition, competition among jurisdictions as to social and cultural 
issues seems highly likely to generate greater general utility than 
would a nationally uniform overall rule. For example, many people 
have differing utility curves with respect to pornography, religious 
holiday displays, abortion regulation, or sexual mores more gener-
ally. On these issues, it seems to me that general utility would be 
maximized by not having uniform national rules. 
Throughout history, societies always have tolerated some re-
gional variation on these types of social matters. A very typical and 
healthy pattern has combined relative rural traditionalism with rela-
tive urban hedonism. This pattern, which can be observed in many 
different cultures on different continents over a period of thousands 
of years, serves many valuable social purposes. It recognizes that 
people cannot agree easily on matters of social culture and religious 
traditionalism, and it allows them to form their own communities 
within the nation which reflect and enforce differing community 
values from the traditional to the hedonic. This arrangement not 
only promotes happiness for many people who would be unhappy if 
forced to live in a large nation-state under one set of social and 
cultural rules, it also promotes happiness by equipping a nation 
with differing sets of options that can compete with one another 
and check one another in the extreme. Such a competition might 
help guard against extreme moments either of hedonism or of puri-
tanism. This is not a bad thing for a nation to have as a result of 
social and cultural pluralism and federalism. 
As I said at the opening of this subsection, the Supreme Court's 
national Fourteenth Amendment law on social and cultural issues is 
a mixed bag from the perspective of normative federalism theory. 
Some of the antidiscrimination components of that law have a lot to 
recommend them; some of the more substantive components have 
created nothing but trouble. The basic problem with the latter is 
this: in the name of enforcing tolerance of the rights of dissenting 
individuals on the states, the Supreme Court has exhibited an ex-
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treme and almost bigoted intolerance toward the communitarian 
rights of people who want to live in moral cultures that are free of 
things like pornography or abortion. This "liberal bigotry and paro-
chialism," for lack of a better term, is contemptuous of federalism 
and of democracy both. A narrow-minded dictatorship of secular 
individualists is still a dictatorship. 
B. Is the Supreme Court Institutionally Best Suited To Be the 
National Lawmaking Body on Each of These Matters? 
As we have seen, the normative case for national lawmaking is 
strong with respect to protection of political rights and antidis-
crimination rights and much weaker with respect to criminal proce-
dure and social and cultural issues. With respect to these two latter 
categories, we might well benefit by setting a national floor that 
states could not go below while allowing much more state experi-
mentation and competition than we presently tolerate. 
But whatever one concludes with respect to what substantive 
issues ought to be nationalized and constitutionalized, one still must 
face the question of the Supreme Court's institutional capacity as a 
Court qua court. Does the Supreme Court have the right stuff to 
administer national law in each of these four areas? Let me offer 
here only a few very brief and tentative conclusions. 
With respect to political rights, the Court's expertise seems 
clear. The Court must enforce such rights against the federal gov-
ernment under the First Amendment, and it has done by and large 
a pretty good job of this. Importing that doctrine to the state level 
is relatively easy and the gains from doing so are high. Among the 
gains are the fact that the large resulting body of state case law 
becomes a weapon to use against the federal government should it 
ever try to restrict political rights - a grave and dangerous pros-
pect. The Court, in theory, could become abusive in this area, but it 
has not happened yet. Moreover, the Court is not likely to become 
very activist in policing the political process given its many vulnera-
bilities to attack, particularly by Congress. 
The Court also seems institutionally well-suited to enforce the 
antidiscrimination principle. Treating like cases alike is the heart of 
the common law method,218 and that is all equal protection law is 
about in the end. Moreover, invalidating state classifications under 
equal protection still can leave states with a lot of room to respond 
218. See generally Gumo CALABRESI, A CoMMON LAW FOR nm AGE OF STATUTES 14 
{1982) (discussing this principle and urging, accordingly, that statutes be updated by courts so 
that they will fit with the rest of the legal topography). 
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by passing new laws. Finally, such invalidation typically does not 
require that the judiciary write up its rule or balancing test. All that 
is required is rejecting the state-made law, a simple task, not formu-
lating a new workable national law, a difficult task. 
This is not to deny that if it is pushed too hard the antidis-
crimination principle can be made to tum into something substan-
tive. Not much is gained if substantive due process rules simply are 
reformulated as substantive equal protection rules instead. But thh 
simply shows that disingenuous Supreme Court Justices can claim 
that laws are discriminatory based on criteria that the federal society 
at large does not think are discriminatory as a matter of widely 
shared consensus. In the end, the federal courts would not get into 
any trouble in this area if they simply would enforce the existing 
suspect classifications without recognizing any new ones in the ab-
sence of a broadly and widely shared social consensus.219 It is only 
the abuse of equal protection law to make it serve as an engine of 
social change that is problematic.zzo 
The Court is not institutionally well-suited to draw up national 
criminal procedure codes. At first glance, this seems a little surpris-
ing since, after all, criminal trials and appeals are the business of the 
courts, so presumably the Supreme Court might be thought to have 
some expertise here. Unfortunately, the Court, our highest na-
tional appellate court, is way too out of touch with trial practice and 
the realities of local law enforcement to be a fully effective 
lawmaker in this field. Moreover, criminal procedure lawmaking 
requires flexibility and openness to change and revision based on 
actual real-world experience. This too presents difficulties for the 
Court, which must "legislate" in the name of the Constitution, a 
document that, in theory at least, is supposed to be timeless and not 
easily altered. 
Another difficulty for the Court in the criminal procedure area 
has stemmed from the awkwardness of trying to capture in a rule 
the factual complexity inherent in many criminal procedure 
problems. The result of this has been an overreliance on balancing 
219. A consensus shared, for example, by three-quarters of the states, see U.S. CoNsT. 
art. V. Compare Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (using conventional-
ism to determine the meaning of the open-ended language of the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause of the Eighth Amendment). 
220. One area where I think equal protection law still should be used to produce social 
change is in combating racial discrimination. The original meaning of the Clause provides a 
floor below which the conventional understanding should not be allowed to fall. I still do not 
believe we have done nearly enough to fulfill the original promise of the Clause to stamp out 
racial discrimination in law administration and enforcement. 
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tests and totality of the circumstances tests that do little to provide 
guidance for state courts and law enforcement officials but preserve 
the possibility of federal judicial intervention in state criminal pro-
cedure. The line-drawing problems thus created make a mockery 
of the claim of the Lopez dissenters that enforcement of the Com-
merce Clause raises unusually and prohibitively difficult line-
drawing issues.221 Whatever the difficulties of the line-drawing is-
sues created by judicial enforcement of the Commerce Clause, they 
are certainly no worse than the difficulties created by the Court's 
national rules on what constitutes a reasonable state search and 
seizure.222 
Finally and most importantly, what can be said about the 
Court's institutional capacity to draw up national rules on state so-
cial and cultural issues? Here, obviously, the Court suffers from its 
isolation from the feedback of the democratic processes and from 
the difficulty of maintaining legislative flexibility when making law 
in the name of the Constitution. The Court also lacks an institu-
tional structure that is well-suited to the making of national sub-
stantive law in a federation on issues that are hotly contested. 
Unlike Congress, the Court is not divided into two houses, it does 
not have to present its laws to the President, it is very small, and it 
lacks mechanisms - like the Senate filibuster - that protect mi-
nority rights. 
The odd result is that it is much easier for five Justices to make 
national rules on the minute details of abortion or pornography reg-
ulation than it is for a majority of Congress to make national rules 
on trucking or cable regulation! This is structurally and institution-
ally absurd. National laws on social and cultural issues tend to be 
very controversial and divisive. If ever a consensual national law-
making mechanism were needed, it would be in this area. The 
Court is not federally representative of regional diversity223 and at 
221. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1663-64 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
222. Obviously, some of these criminal procedure line-drawing issues remain a problem 
even absent the application of national criminal procedure to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Bill of Rights raises these issues with respect to national criminal 
trials, and, for these, the only solution is an amendment-by-amendment reconsideration of 
the case law. Happily, this project now is being undertaken very well by Professor Akhil 
Amar. See Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The 
Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MicH. L. REv. 857 (1995); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amend-
ment First Principles, 107 HARV, L. REv. 757 (1994); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CoN-
STITUTION AND CruMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (forthcoming 1996). 
223. The present Supreme Court is dominated heavily by people who grew up in or have 
lived in the northeastern, socially liberal part of the country: Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, 
Scalia, and Souter. The South and the Midwest have one Justice each, Thomas and Stevens, 
while the libertarian West has three: Kennedy, O'Connor, and Rehnquist. Obviously, not 
826 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 94:752 
most can have one Justice from each of nine states. It is structurally 
a very odd national institution to entrust with power over these ar-
. eas of our common federal life. 
C. Overview 
The prevailing wisdom holds that the Court should abstain from 
deciding enumerated powers cases in order to conserve its political 
capital for use in individual rights cases, the overwhelming majority 
of which are based on the Fourteenth Amendment. Federalism the-
ory, however, suggests that we probably now have more national 
Fourteenth Amendment law than is desirable and that for institu-
tional competence reasons, the Court may not always be the right 
institution to be making national law in many of the areas in which 
it is presently engaged. I express no final opinion here about what, 
if anything, should be done to restructure the Court's Fourteenth 
Amendment case law. To do so would require a positive legal the-
ory of the proper meaning of the Amendment, something that I 
presently cannot offer and that is beyond the limited scope of this 
article. I am sure, however, that I disagree with Professor Choper's 
claim of comparative institutional competence. Contrary to his 
view and to the view of most scholars, the Court is not serving the 
country better when it is off enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment 
and ignoring enumerated powers. Rather, it is serving the country 
worse. 
V. PRECEDENT, RELIANCE, AND LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS 
The last problem I wish to tum to in this article is the problem 
of precedent. Whatever the right answer to the Commerce Clause 
issues raised by Lopez, is it too late in the day for us to revisit the 
New Deal Constitutional Revolution with respect to these matters? 
After all, sixty years have gone by, and an enormous body of law 
has grown up around the expanded notion of federal power that 
was legitimized in the 1930s and 1940s. Huge areas of our national 
and economic life are affected by that enormous body of law, and 
people have planned their businesses, careers, and personal lives in 
reliance on statutes that undoubtedly would have been held to be 
unconstitutional prior to 1937. Can we ignore these reliance inter-
ests and return to the pre-1937 case law, and, if not, what are we to 
every Justice shares the social and cultural tastes of the regions from which they hail but 
enough do so that the Court's 7-to-2 bicoastal majority is regularly dominant on social and 
cultural issues. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
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do given the normative appeal that federalism continues to hold for 
at least some of us? 
First, I do not think the federal courts can ignore the powerful 
reliance interests that have grown up around the statutes enacted 
during and after the New Deal in reliance on a broader understand-
ing of the Commerce Clause. Congress itself can repeal statutes for 
federalism reasons, as it is now doing, without worrying about con-
siderations of precedent. The legislative process is such that new 
laws can be phased in over a period of many years thus accommo-
dating reliance interests quite readily. 
The judicial process is much more rigid, however, and sudden 
mass overrulings would cause social disruption that the Court could 
do little to soften. The likeliest social reaction, in my view, to a 
sudden judicial abrogation of the New Deal would be a constitu-
tional amendment formalizing the currently flawed case law under-
standings of the scope of congressional power. This result wrongly 
would upset the public while setting back if not destroying the 
cause of federalism. I therefore think it would be a grave mistake 
for the Court to overrule abruptly key New Deal precedents, many 
of which even may be defensible under the functional theory of fed-
eralism set out in Part I. 
Notwithstanding its rigidity, however, the judicial process does 
have ways of accommodating evolutionary change back in the di-
rection of a meaningful federalism case law. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist is well aware of this, and he has crafted ably in Lopez an 
opinion that allows room for doctrinal movement toward the resto-
ration of federalism without any socially disturbing disruption of 
legitimate expectations. His success in this regard is attested to by 
the amazingly quiet reaction to his breathtaking opinion - an 
opinion that has produced much gnashing of teeth among law 
professors but barely a ripple of protest among the public at large. 
This success is much more than the success of a judicial politician, 
as some might critically say. It is the success of someone who un-
derstands the nature of the adjudicative process with its reliance-
protecting doctrines. 
Adjudicative change is facilitated by an opinion like Lopez, 
which separates out past cases the Court has had to decide from 
those future cases appearing on the Court's docket. The real feder-
alism issue for the Supreme Court is how to address Commerce 
Clause challenges to newly enacted statutes, not whether Darby or 
Heart of Atlanta were decided correctly. Law professors who have 
to teach those cases may worry - rightly or wrongly - about their 
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reasoning, but everyone else in society has long since moved on.224 
The issues in Commerce Clause cases are highly fact-specific, and a 
finding that there was a significant effect on interstate commerce in 
one area should not preclude a different factual finding in another. 
I think the Court should just stipulate that the old Commerce 
Clause precedents on the books are right on the facts and move 
on.225 That does not mean that new federal statutes, like the one in 
Lopez, have to be analyzed as deferentially and sloppily as were 
some of the old New Deal statutes that were upheld. 
The fact is that valid and judicially cognizable reliance interests 
do spring up around old statutes that have been upheld as constitu-
tional.226 Such interests do not, however, spring up in precisely the 
same way around old judicial tests like the cumulative effects test or 
the rational basis test, both of which are critiqued ably by Professor 
Epstein in his most recent article on the commerce power. The 
public is totally unaware of these tests, and even the Congress is 
probably only conscious of them in a very dim way. If they were to 
be overruled prospectively tomorrow or if we were to learn in some 
future case that Lopez signaled their abandonment, what harm to 
reliance interests would be done? There is no public or congres-
sional reliance interest in the continuing use of a judicial test that is 
both normatively indefensible as a matter of federalism theory and 
is inconsistent with the original understanding. Let us assume that 
since 1937 there may have been advances in the understanding of 
federalism theory, drawn from the insights of comparative law and 
from the interplay between law and economics. If that is the case, 
why should we privilege a Model-T New Deal understanding of fed-
eralism over our present better understanding when dealing with 
newly enacted statutes? There is no precedentially compelling reli-
ance interest that should force the Supreme Court to continue to 
224. See Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, supra note 150. 
225. As I suggested above, the external effects of private racial discrimination in the 
South were so severe and pervasive that Congress was right, in my judgment, in concluding 
that the state legal structures that permitted and sanctioned this discrimination acted as a 
clog on commerce. Similarly, certain labor practices earlier in this century, such as the legal-
ity of child labor, should have been seen as being regulable under Congress's Commerce 
Clause power, again because of the need to suppress practices in certain states that had seri-
ous negative consequences on other states and on the nation as a whole. With both Southern 
apartheid and child labor, there were serious defects in the political process that made it 
plausible for Congress to conclude that the states were unlikely to remedy the underlying 
evil. 
226. For this reason, I do not favor overruling a whole host of Commerce Clause prece-
dents. An exception should be made for Wickard which is so absurd and so exceptional that 
it usefully and safely could be overruled just to illustrate that the old era of limitless national 
power is at an end. 
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use normatively bad rules for deciding new cases. As former Judge 
Robert Bork urged in this context, we should just say to the Court: 
"Go, and sin no more."227 
That being said, the new rules announced in Lopez by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist are less than crystal clear about what factors 
should be weighed in determining when intrastate activity has a sig-
nificant enough effect upon interstate commerce to support federal 
legislative intervention. We know that there was not a significant 
enough effect on the facts of Lopez itself, and we know that Justice 
Rehnquist's opinion does not make a distinction based on whether 
the subject matter of the federal regulation has to do with economic 
activity or whether it has to do with education or local law enforce-
ment. But, how then are we to decide what intrastate effects are or 
are not enough to sustain a finding of federal legislative power? 
I submit that consideration of the normative theory of federal-
ism set forth herein in Part I might prove very useful. Concepts like 
"direct effect on commerce" or "significant effect on commerce" or 
even "interstate commerce" itself are quite hard to define and un-
derstand although they do get at something - certainly there is a 
difference between "commerce" and "education," for example. 
But, more functional criteria, like whether an intrastate activity 
generates appreciable externalities, are not difficult to understand. 
There may be many close factual questions and perhaps much need 
to defer to Congress when the facts are in doubt, but there is no 
inherent difficulty in understanding the concept of a negative exter-
nality the way there is in understanding the concept of "a significant 
effect on interstate commerce."228 A significant effect on interstate 
commerce is whatever the Court says it is.229 An externality is an 
economically and politically understood term that the Court some-
times may have trouble applying but that it is very used to applying 
in the dormant Commerce Clause context.23o 
Moreover, there are many reasons to think that the Court might 
be very sensitive to the dangers posed by the federalization of crim-
inal law. Lower federal courts are already swamped with federal 
criminal cases as the Justices surely must be aware. Yet, their cur-
rent case load is minuscule compared with what might soon happen 
227. BoRK, supra note 18, at 159. 
228. In fact, the Court recognizes and suppresses negative externalities generated by state 
law all of the time in its dormant Commerce Clause case law. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, 
supra note 110; Farber & Hudec, supra note 24; Regan, supra note 178. 
229. Kind of like an undue burden. 
230. See supra note 228. 
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if Congress continues to nationalize state criminal law. The Court 
thus has both the knowledge and the incentive in this area espe-
cially to hold Congress back. Continued federalization of the crimi-
nallaw is bad for the Court as well as for the country. 
I would not pretend that the comparative, historical, and eco-
nomic theory of federalism set out in Part I solves the problem of 
how to discern what issues are properly national and what issues 
are properly local, but it does help a lot. At a minimum, it offers 
more useful guidance than can be gleaned from the Court's opinion 
in Lopez or than usually can be gleaned from one of the Court's 
multifactored balancing tests. Applied with deference and judicial 
humility, the comparative, historical, and economic theory of feder-
alism set out in Part I could provide the basis for the growth of a 
new Commerce Clause case law, built on the foundational cases de-
cided by the New Deal Court but informed by a better and more 
sophisticated understanding of the benefits and limitations of feder-
alism. Ironically, such a new doctrine would lead us back closer to 
the original understanding of federalism and away from the uncon-
stitutional modem misunderstandings. As that greatest of revolu-
tionaries, Thomas Jefferson, once wrote in a letter to James 
Madison, "The earth belongs to the living."231 Rise up, ye 
grandchildren of the New Deal! It is time to throw off the chains of 
a Model-T era of flawed constitutionalism. 
CONCLUSION 
The prevailing wisdom is that the Supreme Court should abstain 
from enforcing constitutional limits on federal power for reasons of 
judicial competence and because the Court should spend essentially 
all its political capital enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment against 
the states instead. This view is wrong. First, the rules of constitu-
tional federalism should be enforced because federalism is a good 
thing, and it is the best and most important structural feature of the 
U.S. Constitution. Second, the political branches cannot be relied 
upon to enforce constitutional federalism, notwithstanding the con-
trary writings of Professor Jesse Choper. Third, the Supreme Court 
is institutionally competent to enforce constitutional federalism. 
Fourth, the Court is at least as qualified to act in this area as it is in 
the Fourteenth Amendment area. And, fifth, the doctrine of stare 
231. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, September 6, 1789, reprinted in 
THE POUTICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 19, at 95, 99. 
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decisis does not pose a barrier to the creation of any new, prospec-
tively applicable Commerce Clause case law. 
The conventional wisdom is that Lopez is nothing more than a 
flash in the pan.232 Elite opinion holds that the future of American 
constitutional law will involve the continuing elaboration of the 
Court's national codes on matters like abortion regulation, pornog-
raphy, rules on holiday displays, and rules on how the states should 
conduct their own criminal investigations and trials. Public choice 
theory suggests many reasons why it is likely that the Court will 
continue to pick on the states and give Congress a free ride. But, it 
would be a very good thing for this country if the Court decided to 
surprise us and continued on its way down the Lopez path. Those 
of us who comment on the Court's work, whether in the law re-
views or in the newspapers, should encourage the Court to follow 
the path on which it has now embarked. The country and the world 
would be a better place if it did. 
We have seen that a desire for both international and devolu-
tionary federalism has swept across the world in recent years. To a 
significant extent, this is due to global fascination with and emula-
tion of our own American federalism success story. The global 
trend toward federalism is an enormously positive development 
that greatly increases the likelihood of future peace, free trade, eco-
nomic growth, respect for social and cultural diversity, and protec-
tion of individual human rights. It depends for its success on the 
willingness of sovereign nations to strike federalism deals in the be-
lief that those deals will be kept.233 The U.S. Supreme Court can do 
its part to encourage the future striking of such deals by enforcing 
vigorously our own American federalism deal. Lopez could be a 
first step in that process, if only the Justices and the legal academy 
would wake up to the importance of what is at stake. 
232. Recent efforts in Congress to devolve major powers and responsibilities to the states 
are not viewed so casually and with good reason. Some major devolution seems likely to be 
permanent as part of the decentralization that the post-Cold War world seems to be exper-
iencing everywhere. The end of the Cold War is likely to continue to weaken central govern-
ments all over the world. War, after all, is the health of the State. 
233. See Blumstein, supra note 34; Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 110. 
